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The following study examines a material but less understood component of the public 
audit marketplace, namely the provision of “audit-related” services to financial statement audit 
clients. I use the benefit plan audit service setting to examine the company and benefit plan 
characteristics associated with auditor selection and the impact of audit-related services on 
financial statement audit quality. I provide market evidence of distinct shifts in the use of the 
same audit firm for the financial statement audit and other audit-related services over time as 
well as characteristics of the choice of auditors. I then test whether having the same audit firm 
for both types of audit services is associated with financial statement audit quality as measured 
by missed misstatements (revealed through future restatements). I find that companies that 
engage the same audit firm for their financial statement audit and benefit plan audit are less 
likely to have subsequent restatements. I also test whether having the same audit firm for both 
types of audit services is associated with switching the financial statement audit firm. I find that 
companies that engage the same audit firm for their financial statement audit and benefit plan 
audit are associated with a lower likelihood of switching their financial statement audit firm.  
Overall, my results suggest that choosing the same auditor for both the financial 
statement audit and audit-related services is associated with a higher level of financial statement 
audit quality consistent with knowledge spillover between the financial statement and benefit 
plan audits. My findings also suggests that who provides audit-related services, and whether or 
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) established greater restrictions on the services 
that financial statement auditors can provide to their clients due to concerns over the potentially 
detrimental effects of impaired auditor independence (SEC 2007; U.S. House of Representatives 
2002). As a result, many audit committees have questioned their company’s use of auxiliary 
audit services even when allowed by law (Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2011; Gaynor McDaniel, 
and Neal 2006; Abbott, Parker, Peters, and Raghunandan 2003a). In contrast, many market 
proponents argue that the provision of services outside the financial statement audit may improve 
the quality of audits as a result of knowledge spillover (SEC 2001). While the restrictions and 
debate have focused primarily on “nonaudit” services, financial statement auditors are often used 
to provide “audit-related” services outside of the financial statement audit.1 Audit-related 
services provide a setting to examine the characteristics of auditor choice and the potential 
benefits of auxiliary services provided by the financial statement auditor.  
In this study, I examine how the provision of benefit plan audit services has changed over 
time and I examine the characteristics of engaging the financial statement auditor for benefit plan 
                                                            
1 SOX (2002) defines audit as “an examination of the financial statements of any issuer by an 
independent public accounting firm in accordance with the rules of the Board or the 
Commission, for the purpose of expressing an opinion on such statements.” The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) (2003) defines audit-related services as “assurance and related 
services that traditionally are performed by the independent accountant.” SOX (2002) defines 
nonaudit services as “any professional service provided to an issuer by a registered public 
accounting firm, other than those provided to an issuer in connection with an audit or a review of 
the financial statements of an issuer.” When examining the potential impact of auxiliary services 
provided by the financial statement auditor, prior literature often considers audit-related services 
to be a category of nonaudit services (Paterson and Valencia 2011; Kinney, Palmrose, and 
Scholz 2004). Regulators consider audit-related services to be a subset of nonaudit services in 
that audit-related fees are not categorized as audit fees within the company’s required auditor fee 
disclosures (SEC 2015). The SEC also lists employee benefit plan audits as a type of service that 
would be included under the category “audit-related fees” (SEC 2014). 
2 
audits. I also test whether having the same audit firm for both the financial statement audit and 
the benefit plan audit affects financial statement audit quality and benefit plan audit quality. I test 
the characteristics of benefit plan quality. I also test benefit plan audit firm switches and financial 
statement audit firm switches. 
Although there exists a strong concern among regulators, market participants, and service 
providers that nonaudit services may impair auditor independence, prior research generally finds 
no association between aggregated nonaudit services and audit quality (Ashbaugh, LaFond, and 
Mayhew 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002; 
Simunic 1984). However, these studies are limited in their ability to identify the nature of these 
services when the services are not provided by the financial statement auditor (e.g., Gleason and 
Mills 2011; Paterson and Valencia 2011; DeFond et al. 2002; Simunic 1984).2 Moreover, market 
participants have expressed concerns about the unintended consequences of overly restricting the 
services provided by the financial statement auditor (e.g., Copeland 2002; Goldwasser 2002; 
Shedlarz 2002; SEC 2001). 
Using the benefit plan audit setting, I am able to examine a distinct audit-related service 
that is purchased by companies across multiple industries and requires public disclosure of the 
accounting firm service provider. This setting creates a unique opportunity to identify the 
potential demand for auxiliary services provided by accounting firms and whether or not the 
financial statement auditor is utilized for these services. It also allows me to examine the 
potential unintended consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the market for accounting firm 
services. The audit-related service setting provides a theoretically consistent setting to examine 
                                                            
2 See Gaver and Paterson (2013) for an example in the literature that identifies the auditor of the 
actuarial services (a nonaudit service) in the insurance industry. 
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the potential knowledge spillover effects of auxiliary services provided by the financial statement 
auditor. 
Benefit plan audits represent an economically significant service provided by the 
accounting firm industry. Benefit plans audited in 2010 included $5.7 trillion in benefit plan 
assets and represented approximately 93 million participants (DOL 2012). Providers of these 
audit-related services are subject to explicit professional standards and regulations (DOL 2015a). 
Benefit plan audits mirror the process of traditional financial statement audits. While such 
accounting firm services have historically been seen as off-season auxiliary services, benefit plan 
audits often occur concurrent with the traditional financial statement audit. This timing is 
particularly true during the post-SOX regulatory regime in which increasing internal control and 
substantive audit procedure occur during interim periods. 
My sample includes filers of 11-K reports (the benefit plan’s financial statements and 
related auditor’s opinion) from 2004 through 2012. Specifically, I examine the trend in the 
provision of these benefit plan audits and the company specific characteristics. I then test 
whether having the same audit firm for both types of audit services is associated with financial 
statement audit quality as measured by missed misstatements (as revealed through future 
restatements). I also test the association between having the same audit firm and types of 
misstatements, specifically payroll-related and debt-related misstatements, in order to have more 
evidence of knowledge spillover between the benefit plan audit and the financial statement audit. 
I test whether having the same audit firm for both types of audit services is associated with 
benefit plan audit quality as measured by benefit plan restatements and late benefit plan filings 
and whether it is associated with benefit plan quality as measured by the disclosure of excise 
taxes or late contributions and the reporting of Employee Benefits Security Administration 
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(EBSA) fines. I also test the characteristics of switching benefit plan auditors and the 
characteristics of switching financial statement auditors. 
Overall, I document a distinct shift in these services in the audit market. The provision of 
benefit plan audits by financial statement auditors has decreased from 72.2 percent in 2004 to 
50.9 percent in 2012. I find that larger companies are more likely to engage the same audit firm 
for both the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit. I find evidence that engaging the 
same audit firm for the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit is associated with a 
lower likelihood of a misstatement. I also find that engaging the same audit firm for the financial 
statement audit and the benefit plan audit is associated with a lower likelihood of payroll-related 
and a lower likelihood of debt-related misstatements. These findings suggests that companies 
benefit from the knowledge spillover between the two engagements.  
I find limited evidence of an association between having the same audit firm provide both 
the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit and benefit plan audit quality as measured 
by benefit plan restatements and benefit plan late filings. I find no association using benefit plan 
restatements and a positive association using benefit plan late filings. I also find no association 
between having the same audit firm provide both the financial statement audit and the benefit 
plan audit and benefit plan quality as measured by the disclosure of excise taxes or late 
contributions and the reporting of EBSA fines. Collectively, my findings suggests that the 
company’s financial statement audit benefits from having the same audit firm perform its benefit 
plan audit; however, this benefit is not necessarily reciprocated with the financial statement audit 
providing incremental benefit to the benefit plan audit. 
I find that companies with a Big N benefit plan auditor in the prior period are more likely 
to switch their benefit plan auditor whether or not the company had the same auditor providing 
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the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit in the prior period. This finding suggests 
that companies may be more concerned with a potential price premium that is associated with the 
Big N. Combined with my previous findings regarding the characteristics of benefit plan quality, 
it seems that the Big N do not seem to be associated with a higher level of benefit plan quality. 
I find that companies with the same audit firm providing the financial statement audit and 
the benefit plan audit are associated with a lower likelihood of switching their financial statement 
audit firm. While companies that have switched benefit plan audit firm are associated with a 
higher likelihood of switching their financial statement audit firm. These findings suggests that 
the provider of audit-related services may affect financial statement audit firm switching. 
My paper contributes to the academic literature in several ways. I contribute by adding 
evidence on the relation between audit-related services and audit quality. Prior research has 
focused primarily on nonaudit service fees without having a clear control sample of companies 
receiving the same nonaudit services from another audit firm (Paterson and Valencia 2011; 
Kinney et al. 2004; DeFond et al. 2002; Simunic 1984). I extend this literature by considering a 
setting where (1) I know the identity of the audit firm providing the nonaudit service and (2) the 
type of service is audit-related and seemingly homogenous across industries. However, it is the 
variation in complexity among benefit plans that adds additional depth to the benefit plan setting. 
This unique setting allows me to study the potential for knowledge spillover between an audit-
related service and the financial statement audit and to explore whether the financial statement 
audit also aids in an audit-related service. I further contribute to the academic literature by 
offering a descriptive analysis of benefit plan audits. I also contribute to the academic literature 
by offering evidence of an affect between audit related services and financial statement auditor 
switching. I expect the results of this study to be of interest to the Securities and Exchange 
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Commission (SEC), Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and other 
regulators concerned with the effect of nonaudit services on audit quality. My results should also 
be of interest to practitioners as they determine whether to specialize in benefit plan audits and to 
audit committees in the selection of nonaudit service providers. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. I discuss prior literature and develop 
my hypothesis in section II. I present my sample characteristics and data collection in Section III. 
I present my research design in section IV, and report empirical results in section V. I conclude 
in section VI. 
II. BACKGROUND, PRIOR LITERATURE, AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Benefit Plan Audits 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) set standards for 
companies offering benefit plans in order to protect benefit plan participants.3 ERISA is 
administered by three governmental agencies: the Department of Labor (DOL), the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (DOL 2015a). The DOL 
sets the regulatory standards for the operation of benefit plans, and when audits are required, the 
DOL oversees the quality of benefit plan audits (DOL 2015a). The types of benefit plans covered 
by ERISA include defined contribution plans, defined benefit pensions, and welfare plans. 
My study focuses on the audits of defined contribution plans. Prior research has 
documented the increase in the number of defined contribution plans offered relative to defined 
benefit plans (Gustman and Steinmeier 1992). Unlike a defined benefit plan that promises 
participants a specific monthly benefit at retirement, a defined contribution plan allows 
                                                            
3 For example ERISA requires companies to provide participants with plan information, file a 
Form 5500 (an informational return administered by the IRS), and carry out certain fiduciary 
responsibilities.  
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participants and/or their employer to contribute money to an individual account in the plan (DOL 
2015b). At retirement, the participant receives the balance of the account (DOL 2015b). Since 
defined contribution plans allow for individual participant accounts, companies generally offer 
various investment options for participants to select. When a company offers its own securities 
as an investment option, then the company must file an 11-K in addition to preparing the Form 
5500 for the DOL (AICPA 2015).4 The 11-K requirement makes defined contribution plan audits 
a unique setting in which to consider audit-related services. Generally, benefit plans with more 
than 100 participants are required to obtain an audit of the benefit plan (AICPA EBPAQC 2013). 
The 11-K includes the benefit plan’s audited financial statements and auditor’s opinion. 
The DOL and the PCAOB oversee the quality of benefit plan audits used with the 11-K 
filing. Within the DOL, the Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) oversees benefit 
plans’ compliance with ERISA. EBSA assesses the quality of the audit work by statistically 
sampling from the Form 5500 filings that had an audit opinion attached and then inspecting the 
audit work papers of the audits selected (DOL 2015a). Additionally, the PCAOB inspects audit 
firms of public companies that file 11-Ks as evidenced in their 2013 report (PCAOB 2013).5  
The SEC requires companies to file 11-Ks within 180 days from the plan’s year-end 
(AICPA 2015). The filing deadline for 10-Ks is much earlier with the latest for nonaccelerated 
                                                            
4 The Form 5500 is an informational tax return filed by benefit plans each year and submitted to 
the Internal Revenue Service. 
5 In their report on the 2007 to 2010 inspection of domestic firms that audit 100 or fewer public 
companies, the PCAOB offers the following example as an example of a substantive analytical 
procedure failure:  “A firm failed to develop expectations for its substantive analytical procedure 
by identifying plausible relationships that were reasonably expected to exist. In this instance, the 
issuer was an employee benefit plan. The firm’s primary procedure to test the rollover 
contributions was a substantive analytical procedure in the form of a comparison of the account 
balances for the year under audit with the previous three years, and the firm obtained 
explanations for variances from the issuer.” (PCAOB 2013, 32-33) 
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filers being 90 days after the company’s year-end. Therefore, fieldwork for a benefit plan audit 
generally occurs after the issuance of the company’s 10-K with most 11-Ks being filed during 
June (for companies and plans with a December 31 year-end).6 Although the timing of fieldwork 
for benefit plan audits is typically seen as off-season work for the financial statement audit, 
benefit plan audits are increasingly overlapping with the interim planning, internal control, and 
substantive tests of financial statements. Particularly, with the expanded requirements under the 
post-SOX regime. 
Benefit Plan Audit Complexity 
Benefit plan audits vary depending on the complexity of the accounting choices made by 
the company. Areas of complexity include whether the benefit plan is also an employee stock 
ownership plan (ESOP), whether the benefit plan invests in various types of investments, and 
whether the benefit plan is subject to a collective bargaining agreement. According to the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Audit and Accounting Guide for 
employee benefit plans (2013), “an ESOP is a unique form of defined contribution plan. Under 
the prohibited transaction statutory exemptions, an ESOP has the ability to borrow money and to 
concentrate plan investments in qualifying employer securities” (AAG-EBP 5.90). For ESOPs, 
the additional complexity for the benefit plan audit is the possibility of debt instruments. 
Cullinan (1997, 1998) includes plan assets in joint ventures and real estate as a proxy for benefit 
plan audit complexity. I use an indicator variable indicating whether the company has disclosed a 
joint venture or a real estate holding since these types of investments are hard to value.7 Cullinan 
                                                            
6 See Panel D of Table 1. 
7 Under FASB Statement 157 or Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 820, these types of 
investments are classified as level 3 investments if they have “significant unobservable inputs” 
without “significant other observable inputs” (level 2) or “quoted prices in active markets for 
identical assets” (level 1). 
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(1997, 1998) also uses an indicator variable for whether the benefit plan is unionized as a proxy 
for audit complexity.8 Unionized plans are subject to collective bargaining agreements that 
oversee plan activities such as employee eligibility, employer and employee contributions, 
participant loans, distributions, and termination.  
In addition to audit complexity, ESOPs and unionized plans may indicate that the 
company has additional monitoring or governance. Prior research finds that ESOPs and unions 
can improve a company’s corporate governance (Bova, Dou, and Hope 2015a; Chyz, Leung, Li, 
and Rui 2013). Specifically, ESOPs have a higher percentage of asset invested in employer 
securities giving participants (or employees) a more vested interest in the company. Using a 
sample of 22,452 company-year observations from 1999 through 2007, Bova et al. (2015a) find 
that employee ownership leads to more disclosure by mitigating the relation between employee 
bargaining power and company disclosure. Bova et al. (2015a) suggest that employee ownership 
(measured using ESOPs) plays a role in improving a company’s corporate governance through 
improved transparency with investors. In a similar manner, unionized plans are subject to a 
collective bargaining agreement and more importantly indicate the presence of a unionized 
workforce. While Bova et al. (2015a) find that employee bargaining power reduces company 
disclosure and thus increases information asymmetry between management and investors, 
employee bargaining power or unions offer other types of monitoring of management. Using a 
sample of 1,380 industry-year observations from 1983 through 2002, Chyz et al. (2013) find a 
                                                            
8 Cullinan (1997, 1998) also uses legal fees to proxy for audit complexity; however, companies 
are not required to disclose legal fees in their 11-K filing. Additionally, Cullinan (1997, 1998) 
uses plan amendments as a measure of audit complexity. I do not use plan amendments in my 
models since plan amendments have become more common in the 2000s with additional IRS and 
DOL rule changes related to hardship withdrawals and other technical benefit plan administrative 
changes. 
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negative association between a company’s tax aggressiveness and unions. Chyz et al. (2013) 
suggest that unions may decrease a company’s tax aggressiveness through increased monitoring. 
Overall, ESOPs and unionized plans provide complexity to the benefit plan audit and additional 
monitoring. 
Increased Services and Monitoring 
In addition to ESOPs and unionized plans facilitating additional monitoring of the 
company, the increased time spent by the same audit firm may also be associated with a higher 
level of financial statement audit quality. Prior research has identified frequent visits to an audit 
site by the audit engagement partner and senior management as one of the highest rated attributes 
of audit quality (Carcello, Hermanson, and McGrath 1992).9 Prior research also finds that audit 
firms that gain more client-specific knowledge through extended tenure with a specific client 
place “greater constraints on extreme management decisions in reporting of financial 
performance” (Myers, Myers, and Omer 2003, 779). The increase in client-specific knowledge 
resulting from additional time spent in audit-related fieldwork, whether that is the audit of the 
financial statements or the audit of the benefit plan, may provide additional monitoring of the 
company’s financial reporting process as it might constrain management from aggressive 
financial reporting decisions. 
Prior research also finds that auditors geographically further from their clients are 
associated with a lower audit quality (Jensen, Kim, and Yi 2015). Using a sample of 18,762 
                                                            
9 Other attributes noted by Carcello et al. (1992) include: having a knowledgeable audit team, 
having an audit team with high ethical standards, performing a thorough study of internal 
control, having an active engagement partner, having a partner and manager knowledgeable 
about the client’s industry, having frequent communication between the audit firm and 
management, having strict audit firm guidelines against signing off on uncompleted audit 
procedures, and keeping the client informed about financial reporting developments. 
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company-year observation from 2000 through 2006, Jensen et al. (2015) find that distance 
greater than 100 miles between the audit firm and the client is associated with a high level of 
audit quality as measured by the absolute value of performance matched discretionary accrual. 
Similarly, Choi, Kim, Qui, and Zang (2012) find that geographic proximity between auditors and 
clients affects audit quality measured as accrual-based audit quality. Choi et al. (2012) defines 
geographic proximity based on whether the audit office is in the same metropolitan statistical 
area (MSA) as the client’s headquarters or if the geographic distance between audit firm’s city 
and the client’s city is within 100 kilometers. Choi et al. (2012) use a sample of 12,439 
observations from 2002 through 2005. They argue that “local auditors can more frequently visit 
client firms and observe what goes on there directly” (Choi et al. 2012, 46). This contact 
provides a “mechanism for information exchange” between auditors and their clients (Choi et al. 
2012, 46). While it is difficult to distinguish whether results from Jensen et al. (2015) or Choi et 
al. (2012) are from on-site visits, face-to face meetings, or a better understanding of the local 
economy, combined with other prior literature it seems likely that increase time spent at a 
client’s office might lead to better monitoring (Jensen et al. 2015; Myers et al. 2003; Carcello et 
al. 1992). For my setting, providing audit-related services to the existing audit clients increases 
the likelihood of the auditor spending additional time at the client’s office which may improve 
audit quality. 
Benefit Plan Industry Specialist 
Prior research argues that industry specialist auditors have greater knowledge of the 
industry and accounting practices when compared to non-industry specialists resulting in higher 
audit quality (Dopuch and Simunic 1982). Knechel, Naiker, and Pacheco (2007) finds a positive 
market reaction to companies switching to a specialist auditor. In my setting, there is only one 
12 
“industry” – the benefit plan – since the accounting practices and audit procedures for a benefit 
plan do not vary based on the company’s industry. Similar to industry specialists being positively 
associated with audit quality, the DOL suggests that experienced benefit plan auditors reduce the 
likelihood of deficient accountants’ reports (DOL 2011). The DOL argues, in their most recent 
annual report on benefit plan audit quality, that the size of an audit firm’s benefit plan practice is 
positively correlated with audit quality (DOL 2015a).  
Audit Quality and Audit-Related Services 
 Prior research offers two theories to explain the consequences of offering both nonaudit 
services and financial statement audit services to a specific client: auditor independence and 
knowledge spillover (Simunic 1984). In light of the large amount of nonaudit services provided 
by audit firms prior to SOX, regulators questioned the potential detrimental impact on auditor 
independence. Auditors must be independent in both appearance and in fact (AICPA 1972). Prior 
research reasons that the increased economic bonding between an audit firm and its client could 
impair auditor independence and in turn, audit quality (DeAngelo 1981a). Simunic (1984) 
extends this understanding by adding nonaudit service fees into the equation of potential 
economic bonding between the audit firm and its client. SOX restricted the offering of a large 
number of nonaudit services in an attempt to limit potential damage to auditor independence 
caused by economic bonding between auditor and client. However, many services still remain 
allowable, including “audit-related” services. Given the size of these services and their relation 
to other audit services, it was expected that the negative economic bonding effects would be non-
significant.10  
                                                            
10 In my sample, for companies that disclose benefit plan fees as part of audit-related fees, 
benefit plan fees are 7.5 percent of audit fees on average. 
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The joint provision of nonaudit services could also yield knowledge spillover (Paterson 
and Valencia 2011; Simunic 1984). Knowledge spillovers can include audit efficiencies, 
economies of scale, and a better understanding of the client’s systems (Paterson and Valencia 
2011). Simunic (1984, 680) notes that knowledge spillover can occur during the joint provision 
of nonaudit services since each service “requires knowledge about a company’s operations, its 
industry, etc.” For my setting, both the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit 
require knowledge about the company and payroll internal controls. Sharing knowledge between 
engagements adds to the audit’s efficiency and the auditor’s understanding of the client’s system. 
Prior research tests the relation between nonaudit services and audit quality (Paterson and 
Valencia 2011; Kinney et al. 2004; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; DeFond et 
al. 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; Simunic 1984). Prior research generally finds no association 
between nonaudit services and audit quality when nonaudit services are aggregated (Ashbaugh et 
al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; DeFond et al. 2002; Simunic 1984).11 However, when the 
type of nonaudit service is specified, prior research finds that there is a significant negative 
association between tax services fees and restatements and a positive association between 
unspecified nonaudit services and restatements (Kinney et al. 2004).  
Using a sample of 18,319 companies from 2003 through 2006, Paterson and Valencia 
(2011) find that recurring auditor-provided tax services have a significant negative association 
with restatements while audit-related nonaudit services and other nonaudit services have a 
positive association with restatements. Paterson and Valencia (2011) suggest that knowledge 
                                                            
11 One exception includes Frankel et al. 2002 who document limited evidence on a negative 
association between nonaudit services and audit quality. Other studies have noted that Frankel et 
al.’s (2002) findings may have been sensitive to design choice (e.g., Ashbaugh et al. 2003; 
Chung and Kallapur 2003). 
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spillover between the audit and tax engagement improves the quality of the audit when the 
service is recurring. Paterson and Valencia (2011) argue that knowledge spillover is most likely 
to occur when the nonaudit service is recurring and note that benefit plan audits are a type of 
audit-related service that is recurring. In contrast, they find that the positive association between 
audit-related services and restatements is significantly higher for nonrecurring engagements than 
for recurring ones, but they also find a positive association between recurring audit-related 
services and restatements.12 Paterson and Valencia (2011) measure audit-related services using 
audit-related fees. A limitation with audit-related fees includes the inability to identify the 
specific audit-related service provided. Audit-related services include many different types of 
services that might not be recurring but those fees would be classified as recurring if the 
company has a benefit plan audit provided by its financial statement audit firm.13  
Benefit plan audits are not likely to be terminated when the principal auditor no longer 
audits the benefit plan while some of the other types of audit-related services may be less 
recurrent.14 The reason that benefit plans may be less likely to be terminated is because the 
benefit plan represents employees’ retirements. Other types of audit-related services (e.g., due 
                                                            
12 I recalculate Paterson and Valencia’s (2011) measure of recurring audit-related fees 
(“AR_RECUR”) and find that my measure of having the same auditor for both the benefit plan 
audit and the financial statement audit (SameAU) has a correlation of 0.41 (p-value of 0.000) 
with AR_RECUR. Additionally, I find that SameAU is negatively correlated with misstatements 
for my sample period (and for Paterson and Valencia’s sample period) while AR_RECUR is not 
significantly correlated with misstatements for either sample period.  
13 Paterson and Valencia (2011, 1516) note that audit-related services have many different types 
of services such as “employee benefit plan audits, accounting consultations and audits in 
connections with acquisitions, due diligence related to mergers and acquisitions, internal control 
reviews, attest services that are not required by statute or regulation, and consultations 
concerning financial accounting and reporting standards.” 
14 In a reduced sample of companies for which I can match the companies’ 11-K to the Form 
5500, only four of the companies indicated on the Form 5500 that they were terminating the 
plan. 
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diligence and consultations in connection with mergers and acquisitions) may be more likely to 
be nonrecurring due to the nature of the service. In my sample, all companies are receiving a 
recurring audit-related service with the primary distinction being whether the same audit firm is 
providing both assurance services or if a different audit firm is providing the auxiliary service. In 
both Kinney et al. (2004) and Patterson and Valencia (2011) the research question centers on 
whether having a specific type of nonaudit service provided by the principle audit firm is 
associated with audit quality. I extend this literature by testing whether having the same audit 
firm for both assurance services affect audit quality, given that companies have a recurring 
axillary service. 
Investors view audit-related services more favorably than other types of nonaudit services 
(Mishra, Raghunandan, and Rama 2005). Mishra et al. (2005) use auditor ratification to test 
whether investors perceived audit-related, tax, and other fees differently. Using a sample of 248 
companies, they find a negative association between audit-related fees and the proportion of 
votes against auditor ratification. They find a positive association between tax and other fees and 
the proportion of votes against auditor ratification. Thus, there seems to be a disconnect between 
investors’ perception of audit-related services and prior evidence concerning the link between 
these services and audit quality, in aggregate. My study attempts to provide evidence that could 
help to reconcile these divergent views and address the potentially unintended consequences of 
the SOX restrictions on nonaudit services. 
The Changing Provision of Audit-Related Services 
As previously discussed, SOX created numerous restrictions on the types of services that 
can be offered to a financial statement audit client in an effort to constrain the supply of nonaudit 
services that auditors could provide their audit clients. These restrictions prohibited auditors 
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from providing services such as bookkeeping, financial information systems design and 
implementation, and internal audit outsourcing services (SEC 2007). SOX also requires the audit 
committee to explicitly approve all services provided by the financial statement auditor (SEC 
2007). These changes drastically limited the extent of nonaudit services provided to audit clients 
(Abbott et al. 2011). It also increased the audit committees’ sensitivity to the provision of 
auxiliary services provided by the external auditor (Abbott et al. 2011; Gaynor et al. 2006; 
Abbott et al. 2003a, 2003b). Some studies suggest that SOX may motivate audit committees to 
reduce or eliminate nonaudit service fees even if the services are allowed under the SOX 
guidelines (Abbott et al. 2011; Cook, Huston, and Omer 2008; Omer, Bedard, and Falsetta 
2007). Many audit firms did voluntarily begin to shed their offerings of auxiliary services. 
Combined, these suggest that SOX restrictions may have had unintended consequences on 
certain segments of the public accounting market place. My study begins by examining the 
economic characteristics of the benefit plan audit marketplace. I address the following general 
research question: 
RQ 1 How has the provision of benefit plan audit services changed over time? 
Company, Audit, and Benefit Plan Characteristics 
 While prior research has examined the determinants of aggregated nonaudit services, 
there exists a gap in our understanding of the characteristics of companies that purchase specific 
types of audit related services. Prior research has examined whether fee differences drive the 
purchase of benefit plan audits and finds no difference in the benefit plan audit fee structures 
between Big N and non-Big N audit firms (Cullinan 1997). Using Form 5500 data, Cullinan 
(1997) tests the determinants of pension plan audit fees and focuses on defined benefit plans 
rather than defined contribution plans. Cullinan (1998) finds that Big N audit firms do not obtain 
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fee premiums over non-Big N audit firms for assurance services in the defined benefit plan 
market.15 Although Cullinan (1997) does not test whether or not the company engages the same 
audit firm for the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit, Cullinan (1997) has a 
footnote that explains that of the 50 single employer pension plans he selected, 46 (or 92 percent) 
of the plans had the same auditor for the benefit plan as the financial statement audit.  
Additionally, prior research has examined the relation between non-executive employee 
ownership as measured with ESOPs and corporate risk (Bova, Kolev, Thomas, and Zhang 
2015b). Bova et al. (2015b) also use Form 5500 data to create a measure of non-executive 
employee ownership. Using a sample of 60,235 observations for 9,677 companies for the period 
1999 through 2009, Bova et al. (2015b) find a negative association between non-executive 
holding of stock and corporate risk where corporate risk is measured as the volatility of stock 
returns. Bova et al. (2015a) also uses Form 5500 data to inform the debate on a union workforce 
and corporate disclosure and finds that ESOPs mitigate the negative relation between unions and 
corporate disclosure.  
All of these studies consider the benefit plan setting, but none of them tests the benefit 
plan audit setting in terms of choosing the same audit firm for both the financial statement audit 
and the benefit plan audit. I extend these studies by testing the characteristics of companies and 
their benefit plans that choose to engage the same audit firm compared to those that do not.16 My 
                                                            
15 Cullinan (1997, 1998) uses fee data for defined benefit plans from the Form 5500. Form 5500 
Schedule C requires companies to disclose all fees paid to service providers and does not specify 
whether the fee is audit-related. Benefit Fees found in Audit Analytics are only available for 
companies who disaggregate audit-related fees in 10-K fee disclosures and whose benefit plan 
auditors are primary financial statement auditors. It is interesting that Audit Analytics’ definition 
of Benefit Fees indicates that when benefit plan fees are disclosed, the amount is subtracted from 
audit-related fees. 
16 Companies choosing financial statement auditors for auxiliary services are most often using 
Big N auditors for both assurance services; while companies choosing different providers for 
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next general research question is: 
RQ2: What are the company, audit firm, and benefit plan characteristics of companies 
that engage the same financial statement audit firm and benefit plan audit firm? 
The Benefit of Benefit Plans? 
 Prior research tests whether nonaudit services impair auditor independence or provide an 
environment of knowledge spillover (Paterson and Valencia 2011; Simunic 1984). The nature of 
the benefit plan audit process is theoretically consistent with the information needs and audit 
procedures conducted on the company’s financial statement audits. This attribute creates a 
setting where the potential benefit of knowledge spillover could be manifest. As noted 
previously, benefit plan audits may allow for knowledge spillover given the multiple areas of 
overlap between employee benefit audit and the company’s financial statement audit. 
An audit of an employee benefit plan is very similar to an audit of a company’s financial 
statements in that an audit of an employee benefit plan involves planning and supervision, risk 
assessment and materiality, testing of internal controls, audit testing, evaluation, and reporting 
(AICPA EBPAQC 2013). Areas of potential overlap between the two audits are found in the 
planning, risk assessment, testing of internal controls, and some substantive testing. During the 
planning of an employee benefit audit, an audit firm must gain an understanding of the entity and 
its environment and obtain an understanding of the plan’s internal control (AICPA EBPAQC 
2013). For a benefit plan audit, information from the financial statement audit with regards to 
understanding the entity and understanding the internal control of the payroll transaction cycle 
can be used. During the risk assessment, one area that presents a risk of material misstatement is 
                                                            
auxiliary service use non-Big N audit firms for benefit plan audits and continue using Big N 
audit firms for financial statement audits (see Table 2, Panel E). 
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whether contributions are accurately calculated (AICPA EBPACQ 2013). This risk of material 
misstatement relates to the payroll transaction cycle. Likewise the testing of the payroll cycle can 
be used in the testing of internal controls for the benefit plan. The benefit plan audit considers 
other areas (i.e., investments, benefit payments, compliance, etc.), but the payroll transaction 
cycle is an important area of overlap between a company’s financial statement audit and its 
benefit plan audit.  
The AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for employee benefit plans (2013) describes 
some substantive audit procedures that the benefit plan auditor may perform such as: 
(a) determining that the compensation and hours per the payroll records represent actual 
compensation paid and hours worked based on appropriate supporting evidence. (b) 
reconciling compensation from the payroll records to the [company’s] general ledger. (c) 
if participant files are maintained on a decentralized basis or in the custody of the plan 
administrator, testing whether the data maintained in those files corresponds to the data 
maintained in employer payroll and personnel files. (AICPA 2013, AAG-EBP 5.155) 
 
These types of substantive audit procedures aid the auditor in gaining a better understanding of 
the payroll-transaction cycle for future periods. Additionally, if the payroll reconciliation is 
completed as part of the financial statement audit’s substantive audit procedure, then the 
financial statement audit can share their reconciliation with the benefit plan audit. This 
knowledge transfer is better facilitated when both the financial statement audit and the benefit 
plan audit are performed by the same audit firm. 
For ESOPs, the debt transaction cycle also becomes an important area of potential 
overlap between the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit since ESOPs have the 
ability to borrow money. The ability to borrow money is a prohibited transaction for other types 
of defined contribution benefit plans. The AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for employee 
benefit plans (2013) offers these additional assertions for auditors to consider when testing ESOP 
notes payable:  
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(a) Notes payable exist and are valid obligations of the plan. (b) The notes payable are in 
accordance with the debt agreements and properly classified and disclosed in accordance 
with the applicable financial reporting framework. (c) Interest expense is recorded in 
appropriate amounts and in the proper period. (d) Unallocated shares are properly 
released to eligible participants. (AICPA 2013, AAG-EBP 5.191) 
 
These additional assertions are followed by examples of identified risks of what can go wrong 
such as: 
(a) Debt is not paid in accordance with the debt agreements. (b) Unallocated shares are 
not properly released when debt service is paid. (c) When the debt is between the plan 
and the plan sponsor, contribution and debt repayment transactions may only be “memo” 
entries, with no actual flow of funds causing inaccurate recordkeeping. (d) Dividends and 
interest may not be properly allocated depending on the terms of the loan agreement. (e) 
Shares purchased by the plan may not be at the appropriate value used to secure the debt. 
(AICPA 2013, AAG-EBP 5.192) 
 
The benefit plan auditor addresses these risks by performing procedures that can be used in the 
financial statement audit. For example, the benefit plan auditor may summarize the activity of 
the note payable for the year, gain an understanding of the debt agreement and the underlying 
documents, confirm the balances and terms with the creditor, recomputed interest, review 
covenants, and obtain a five-year schedule of maturities (AICPA 2013, AAG-EBP 5.193). The 
potential overlap between the benefit plan and the company exists in how the debt instrument is 
structured. The AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for employee benefit plans (2013) offers 
the following debt arrangement for a public company with an ESOP, “The employer arranges 
directly for any financing from a commercial lender. A second loan is made between the 
employer and the ESOP. This enables the employer to control the tax consequences and 
employee benefit attributes rather than having the lender dictate such attributes” (AICPA 2013, 
AAG-EBP 5.93). Given that a debt instrument in an ESOP may also affect the company’s 
financial statements, there may be knowledge spillover between the two engagements.  
Overall, it is possible that the benefit plan audit shares knowledge of payroll-related or 
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debt-related activities with the financial statement audit. I present a timeline in Figure 1 to 
illustrate the timing of how the benefit plan audit would influence the financial statement audit 
given that both the benefit plan and the company have calendar year ends. But just as it is 
possible that the benefit plan audit helps facilitate the financial statement audit, it is also possible 
that procedures performed during the financial statement audit (such as a note payable 
confirmation) might also provide knowledge spillover to the benefit plan audit. I present a 
timeline in Figure 2 to illustrate the timing of how the financial statement audit would influence 
the benefit plan audit given that both the benefit plan and the company have calendar year ends. 
Given the audit knowledge overlap between benefit plan audits and the financial statement audit, 
I test the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Audit quality is positively associated with engaging the same financial statement 
audit firm and benefit plan audit firm.  
H1b: Benefit plan audit quality is positively associated with engaging the same financial 
statement audit firm and benefit plan audit firm.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Auditor Switching 
Prior research documents the switching audit firms can be costly (DeAngelo 1981a; 
Blouin, Grein, and Rountree 2007; López and Peters 2009). Using a sample of 407 companies, 
Blouin et al. (2007) find that companies with greater switching costs are more likely to follow 
their former Arthur Andersen audit team to the new audit firm. Their findings suggest that 
switching cost are a major consideration when a company changes its audit firm. Blouin et al. 
(2007, 624) defines switching costs as 
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the start-up costs incurred by the client for a new audit engagement. These include (1) 
costs incurred by the client in educating the auditor about the company’s operations, 
systems, financial reporting practices, and accounting issues, (2) costs incurred by the 
client in selecting a new auditor (e.g., time spent listening to and reviewing proposals), 
and (3) an increased risk of audit failure. 
 
Blouin et al. (2007)’s definition can be applied to both the financial statement audit and the 
benefit plan audit. Both types of audits have substantial switching cost associated with them 
although the increased risk of audit failure may be higher for the financial statement audit rather 
than the benefit plan audit. Using a sample of 10,238 company-year observations, López and 
Peters (2009) find that companies with December year-ends have a lower likelihood of switching 
their financial statement auditor than non-December year-end companies. They suggest that this 
result is consistent with there being higher switching transaction costs for auditors and their busy 
season companies. As with any decision, companies are likely to consider the cost and benefits 
of change before making the final decision. And this is not to say that the decision is one-sided 
with the client always making the decision to end a relationship with their auditor. In my study, I 
do not distinguish between client dismissals and auditor resignations. However, based on prior 
literature (Blouin et al. 2007; López and Peters 2012), there are switching costs and these are 
costs that companies are likely to consider when determining whether they want to change their 
audit firm or not. Two of the costs listed by Blouin et al. (2007) are costs that will be known 
within a year of choosing a new auditor and these costs vary by client. They are the cost of 
educating the new auditor about the company and the cost of selecting a new auditor. It is 
plausible that the perceived cost are higher than the actual cost and that once a company knows 
that the actual cost are lower, a company may be more willing to switch their auditor in the 
future. On the other hand, it is plausible that the perceived cost are lower than the actual cost and 
once a company knows that the actual cost are higher, the company may be less willing to switch 
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their auditor in the future. The benefit plan setting provides a way to determine if switching the 
benefit plan auditor (an audit-related service) is associated with future changes of the financial 
statement auditor. Given that perceived switching cost may be higher than actual switching cost 
or actual switching cost are higher than perceived switching cost, I test the following hypotheses 
(in the null): 
H2: Financial statement auditor switching is not associated with switching the benefit 
plan auditor in the prior period.  
III. SAMPLE SELECTION, DATA COLLECTION, AND DESCRIPTIVES 
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
I test whether having the financial statement auditor provide an audit-related service 
affects audit quality as measured by missed misstatements (as revealed through future 
restatements), given that all of the companies in my sample have a benefit plan. My sample 
period is 2004 through 2012. I use the Audit Analytics database to identify the service provider 
of the benefit plan audit (as evidenced by the audit opinion signature). I make a number of 
adjustments to the benefit plan database to ensure that I have the correct audit firm for the 
calculation of my variable of interest, SameAU. I begin by verifying all audit firm changes within 
the benefit plan database and removing observations when the audit firm is not identifiable.17 I 
also use the PCAOB’s website to identify audit firm mergers and name changes that occur 
                                                            
17 Twenty-four company-year observations recorded the financial statement audit firm rather 
than the benefit plan audit firm, 47 company-year observations recorded the benefit plan audit 
firm as unknown when the audit firm was identified in the filing; 16 company-year observations 
recorded a benefit plan audit firm with a name similar to the actual benefit plan audit firm; 24 
company-year observations recorded an audit firm as unknown but the prior period and the next 
known period have the same auditor and the intermediate years do not indicate an auditor 
change; 2 company-year observations recorded an audit firm as unknown but the next period had 
a change in audit firm with the prior audit firm signing the prior audit opinion; and 17 company-
year observations are removed because the audit firm is unknown. 
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during my sample period to ensure that I have properly identified the audit firm. Companies are 
not required to issue an 8-K when changing benefit plan audit firms (although some do issue an 
8-K for such changes).  
I use the Audit Analytics database to identify companies that restated financial reports 
originally filed for fiscal years 2004 through 2012.18 I include restatements occurring for 
accounting rule application. I use the Audit Analytics database for auditor-related controls, 
Compustat for company-related controls, and CRSP for returns data.  
I summarize the sample selection process in Table 1, Panel A. I begin with 11,641 
company-year observations from the Audit Analytics’ Benefit Plan Opinions Database. I exclude 
observations with data missing in Compustat and observations missing control variables. I also 
exclude observations where the benefit plan opinion was signed on the same day as the financial 
statement opinion and where the benefit plan opinion was signed prior to the financial statement 
opinion. These observations represent opportunities for the benefit plan audit to provide 
knowledge spillover for the current financial statement audit rather than the future financial 
statement audit which represents the majority of the observations. The most common timing of 
the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit is for both the company and the benefit 
plan to have a December 31 year-end with the company’s financial statements filed no later than 
90 days after fiscal year-end and the benefit plan’s financial statements filed no later than 180 
days after fiscal year-end.19 The remaining loss of observations is due to a lack of data for the 
construction of control variables. 
                                                            
18 My window for announcements of such restatements extends through April 15, 2015, allowing 
slightly over 2 years after the last 2012 fiscal year-end for a restatement to be announced. 
19 Panel C of Table 2 provides the frequency of benefit plan signatures during my sample period. 
In untabulated results, 76 percent of my sample have December year ends for both the company 
and the benefit plan. 
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I hand collect data for some of the benefit plan control variables. With the help of Direct 
Edgar, I search all 11-K filings associated with my sample. I search for key words and for more 
ambiguous terms (i.e. collective bargaining agreement or union), I look at each 11-K to 
determine whether the company’s plan was subject to a collective bargaining agreement or if the 
document indicated that those under a collective bargaining agreement were excluded. I also 
found that not every result with the term “union” had a union or collective bargaining 
agreements. Several benefit plans invested in “Union Pacific” and noted each investment in the 
filing. For the 11-K filings in which the employees subject to a collective bargaining agreement 
were excluded from participation in the benefit plan or the term “Union” was a proper name (i.e. 
name of company, address, etc.), I code those observations as not having a collective bargaining 
agreement or union. I also searched for benefit plan restatements, joint venture investments, real 
estate investments, and ESOPs (or employee stock ownership plans). 
Since the Direct Edgar data is dependent on the benefit plan disclosing information in the 
11-K filing, one of the limitations in using that data is that observations that I code as not having 
an attribute may have the attribute (i.e. joint venture, real estate, ESOP) and just not disclosed 
that they have the attribute. To address this limitation, I use data from the Form 5500 from the 
DOL’s website. Since the Form 5500 is an informational return filed by benefit plans to the IRS, 
I feel more confident in the identification of benefit plans that have collective bargaining 
agreements, joint ventures, and real estate investments. However, the downside of using the 
Form 5500 data is that it further reduces my sample and my sample period. To obtain these 
controls I use data for the years 2009 through 2012. I begin with 2009 since the Form 5500 
changed and the variable names given by the DOL for elements in the Form 5500 changed from 
2008 to 2009. The Form 5500 data includes a company identification number (EIN) for each 
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observation. I match the company’s Form 5500 EIN with the company’s EIN in Compustat. This 
procedure results in a match for 2,489 observations for the period 2009 through 2012 out of 
3,640 observations in the larger sample from the same time period.20 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Panel B of Table 1 shows a distribution of observations by year and Panel C provides a 
distribution of observations by industry. I classify observations into 12 industry classifications 
following Fama and French (2015). My observations appear to be slightly declining during my 
sample period, but all years have at least 9.8 percent of the total number of observations. My 
sample covers a range of industries with the largest concentration in the financial industry (27.79 
percent) and the smallest concentration in consumer durables (2.75 percent). Panel D of Table 1 
shows a distribution of observations by the year and month of the benefit plan opinion signature. 
For every year of my sample, the most common month for benefit plan opinions to be signed is 
June, which is consistent with most benefit plans having a year-end of December 31 and a due 
date for the 11-K filing 180 days later on June 30.21   
Panel A of Table 2 presents my descriptive statistics. Fifty-nine percent of the 
observations in the sample use the same audit firm for both the financial statement audit and the 
benefit plan audit. Three percent of the observations have a change in financial statement auditor. 
Seven percent of the observations have a change in benefit plan auditor. Thirty-five percent of 
my sample are benefit plan city experts. Eighty-five percent of my sample use a Big N audit firm 
                                                            
20 In untabulated analyses, I test the correlation between each of the Form 5500 variables and the 
Direct Edgar variables and find a positive and significant correlation for all of them during the 
timer period 2009 through 2013. 
21 In untabulated analyses, 8,377 company-year observations have a benefit plan year-end of 
December 31. 
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for the financial statement audit while only 50 percent of my sample use a Big N auditor for the 
benefit plan audit. Only four percent of the benefit plans are signed during the first three months 
of the year. On average there are approximately 122 days between the signature date of the 
financial statement opinion and the signature date of the benefit plan opinion. Twenty percent of 
the reduced Form 5500 sample have assets invested in joint ventures while thirteen percent of 
my total sample disclose having assets invested in joint ventures. Five percent of the reduced 
Form 5500 sample have assets invested in real estate while fifteen percent of my total sample 
disclose having assets invested in real estate. Thirty-one percent of the reduced sample have 
collective bargaining agreements associated with the benefit plan (Union) while twenty-one 
percent of my total sample disclose having a collective bargaining agreement.  
Panel B of Table 2 presents a difference in means between companies engaging a 
different audit firm and companies engaging the same audit firm. Companies with the same audit 
firm have a lower percentage of Big N audit firms auditing their financial statements (p-value < 
0.01). Companies with the same audit firm are larger, have fewer losses, have greater influence 
with the audit firm, have larger audit fees, and have larger tax fees (p-values < 0.01). Companies 
with the same audit firm also have fewer days between the financial statement opinion and the 
benefit plan opinion (p-value < 0.01). I present Pearson correlations in Panel C of Table 2. 
SameAU and the lag of SameAU are negatively associated with the likelihood of Misstatement. 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
To address my first research question of how the provision of benefit plan audit services 
has changed over time, I present univariate results that suggest an overall trend in the provision 
of benefit plan audit services. I present the distribution of observations of companies engaging 
the same audit firm versus companies choosing a different auditor in Panel D of Table 2. The 
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percentage of companies using the same audit firm for the benefit plan audit decreases each year 
from around 72 percent in 2004 to 51 percent in 2012. I then disaggregate the data from Panel D 
based on whether the financial statement audit firm is a Big N audit firm or not and whether the 
benefit plan audit firm is a Big N audit firm or not. Most companies that engage the same audit 
firm for both assurance services use a Big N audit firm. Most companies that engage a different 
audit firm for the benefit plan audit use a Big N audit firm for the financial statement audit and a 
non-Big N audit firm for the benefit plan audit. 
I present Figure 3 to illustrate the percentage of companies with the same Big N audit 
firm for both their financial statement audit and their benefit plan audit. There appears to be a 
steady decline since 2004 as either more companies choose to have a non-Big N audit firm 
perform their benefit plan audit or Big N audit firms are choosing to diversify their practices 
away from benefit plan audits.  
[Insert Figure 3 here.] 
 I present Figure 4 to illustrate the provision of benefit plan audits. It appears that while 
each of the Big N’s market share of benefit plan audits has decreased slightly during my sample 
period, collectively the decline has allowed for the non-Big N accounting firms to increase their 
collective market share from eight percent in 2004 to sixteen percent in 2012. 
[Insert Figure 4 here.] 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGNS 
Characteristics of Having the Same Auditor 
My second research question focuses on the characteristics of the company, audit firm, 
and benefit plan. To test my second research question, I estimate the following model using a 
logistic regression where my dependent variable is SameAUit:  
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SameAUit = α0 + α1Sizeit + α2Growthit + α3ChangeEMPit + α4Lossit + α5BigNit + α6Influenceit 
+ α7Audit Tenureit + α8Audit Feesit + α9Tax Feesit + α10Other Feesit + αjIndustryFE + 
αkYearFE + εit  (1) 
where: 
SameAUit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company engages the 
same audit firm for its benefit plan audit and financial statement 
audit, and zero otherwise;  
Sizeit = the natural log of total assets; 
Growthit = the percentage change in total assets; 
ChangeEMPit = the abnormal change in employees, defined as the percentage 
change in the number of employees less the percentage change in 
total assets [(EMPt – EMPt-1)/EMPt-1] – [(ATt – ATt-1)/ATt-1]; 
Lossit =  an indicator variable set equal to one if the company reports net 
income less than zero, and zero otherwise; 
BigNit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company engages a Big 
N audit firm for its financial statement audit, and zero otherwise22; 
Influenceit = the sum of a company’s audit and audit-related fees divided by the 
total audit and audit-related fees received by the local audit office; 
Audit Tenureit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company has engaged its 
financial statement auditor for three years or less; 
Audit Feesit = the natural log of audit fees; 
Tax Feesit = the natural logarithm of Tax-related Fees; and 
Other Feesit = the natural logarithm of Other Fees. 
I include year and industry fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by company 
(Petersen 2009). I winsorize all continuous variables at plus and minus one percent. To answer 
my second research question, I test whether different types of characteristics are associated with 
                                                            
22 Big N refers to Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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having the same audit firm for the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit. I first test 
company and audit firm characteristics listed in Equation (1). Then I test benefit plan 
characteristics (see Equation (2)).  
Company Characteristics 
 Company characteristics that might affect whether or not a company chooses to have 
their financial statement audit firm perform the benefit plan audit include company size, growth, 
change of employees, and loss. Larger companies are less likely to be swayed in choosing a low 
cost provider of benefit plan audits and so may choose to avoid auditor switching cost (in 
relation to the benefit plan audit) and retain their financial statement auditor. On the other hand, 
larger companies may also be more likely to choose a different benefit plan audit firm if the 
company is concerned with the perception of auditor independence that might be tarnished by 
increased “audit-related” fees. Growth companies and companies reporting a loss are more likely 
to want to use a lower cost provider of benefit plan audits. On the other hand, growth and loss 
companies may be more likely to use the same audit firm if the company is able to negotiate a 
price based on the assumed synergies that the audit firm would have by performing both 
engagements. The percentage change of employees may represent either a growth or loss 
situation, but more importantly it might also affect the complexity of the benefit plan depending 
on the magnitude of the change of employees. 
Audit Characteristics 
 Audit characteristics that might affect whether or not a company chooses to have their 
financial statement audit firm perform the benefit plan audit include whether the audit firm is a 
Big N audit firm, the influence the company has on the audit firm office, the audit firm’s tenure 
(length of time performing the financial statement audit), and fees.  
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DeAngelo (1981b) argues that audit quality is not independent of firm size. Larger 
auditors are assumed to have more valuable reputations that incentivize them to perform high-
quality audits (DeAngelo 1981b). Prior research finds that Big N auditors are associated with 
higher audit quality (DeFond and Zhang 2014; Lennox and Pittman 2010; Pittman and Fortin 
2004) and are perceived to have higher audit quality (Teoh and Wong 1993). It is conceivable 
that companies selecting a Big N audit firm for their financial statement audit might also select 
the same audit firm for their benefit plan audit in expectation of higher audit quality. However, 
prior research finds that audit committees concerned with the perception of auditor independence 
may limit the amount of nonaudit services provided by their financial statement auditor (Abbott 
et al. 2011).23  
From the auditor’s perspective (rather than the audit committee’s perspective), the more 
influence the company has on the audit firm office, the more likely the audit firm will want to 
keep other audit providers away when the “audit-related” service is allowable if approved by the 
audit committee. And so the expectation of the audit characteristics is unknown as it depends on 
the outlook of the audit committee and the audit firm. 
Benefit Plan Characteristics 
Benefit plan characteristics that might affect whether or not a company chooses to have 
their financial statement audit firm perform the benefit plan audit include the busyness of the 
benefit plan audit firm and the complexity of the benefit plan. To test these additional 
characteristics, I estimate the following model using a logistic regression.  
                                                            
23 For example, Baxter International switched benefit plan audit firms from 
PricewaterhouseCoopers to Crowe Horwath LLP and disclosed on its 2009 Form 5500 Schedule 
C that it “made decision to separate the benefit plan audit process from the corporate audit 
process; as we understand it, having separate auditors is [the] market[s] best practice.” 
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SameAUit = β0 + β1Sizeit + β2Growthit + β3ChangeEMPit + β4Lossit + β5BigNit + β6Influenceit 
+ β7Audit Tenureit + β8Audit Feesit + β9Tax Feesit + β10Other Feesit + β11Busy_bpit  
+ β12Number_of_Plansit + β13Days_bw_opinionsit + β14Unionit + β15Real Estateit  
+ β16Joint Venturesit + β17ESOPit + βjIndustryFE + βkYearFE + εit  (2) 
where: 
Busy_bpit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan audit opinion is signed during the months of January through 
March, and zero otherwise; 
Number_of_Plansit =  the natural log of the number of benefit plans of a company; 
Days_bw_opinionsit =  the natural log of the number of days between the signature date 
of the company’s financial statement audit opinion and the 
signature date of the company’s benefit plan audit opinion; 
Unionit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan discloses in its 11-K filing that it is subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement;  
Union_5500it = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan has unionized participants, and zero otherwise (Form 5500); 
Real Estateit =  an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan discloses in its 11-K filing that it has real estate investments; 
Real Estate_5500it =  an indicator variable set equal to one if the company reports an 
ending asset balance associated with real estate, and zero 
otherwise (Form 5500);  
Joint Ventureit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan discloses in its 11-K filing that it has joint venture 
investments;  
Joint Venture_5500it = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company reports an 
ending asset balance associated with a joint venture, and zero 
otherwise (Form 5500);  
ESOPit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan discloses in its 11-K filing that it has an employee stock 
ownership plan or an ESOP; and 
all other variables have been previously defined and are included in Appendix A. I include year 
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and industry fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by company (Petersen 2009). I 
winsorize all continuous variables at plus and minus one percent. I proxy for busyness of the 
audit firm with Busy_bp, Number_of_Plans, Days_bw_opinions. I proxy for benefit plan 
complexity with Union, Real Estate, Joint Venture, and ESOP (see Section II for a detailed 
discussion on how these proxy for benefit plan complexity).  
I control for the busyness of the auditor during the benefit plan engagement by including 
an indicator variable that captures whether the benefit plan audit opinion was signed during the 
traditional “busy season” or the first three months of the calendar year. The number of benefit 
plans of the company and the number of days between the signature date of the financial 
statement audit opinion  and the date of the benefit plan audit opinion also proxy for different 
aspects of the auditor’s busyness. It is possible that if the audit firm has other more lucrative 
engagements during the first three months of the year that the audit firm might decline to audit a 
benefit plan.24 However, the audit firm might be persuaded to perform the audit at a premium or 
if their financial statement audit client cannot find another audit firm to engage for its benefit 
plan audit. Likewise, a large number of benefit plan audits or a short period between the financial 
statement audit and the benefit plan audit might constrain audit firm resources. However, I have 
no expectation of how benefit plan auditor busyness is associated with having the same auditor 
perform both the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit.  
Audit Quality 
In my first hypothesis (H1a), I hypothesize that engaging the same audit firm for the 
                                                            
24 I present the frequency of the signature date of the benefit plan opinion in Table 1, Panel D. It 
is interesting to note in this table that there is an uptick in the number of benefit plan opinions 
signed in December prior to busy season and a reduced number signed during January and 
February. This phenomenon suggests that audit firms would prefer to move benefit plan 
engagements out of their traditional “busy season”. 
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financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit is positively associated with audit quality. To 
test this hypothesis, I follow Paterson and Valencia (2011) estimating the following logistic 
regression where my dependent variable is Misstatementit: 
Misstatementit = γ0 + γ1SameAUit-1 + γ2Sizeit + γ3MAit + γ4BTMit + γ5Leverageit + γ6FINit  
+ γ7Lossit + γ8BigNit + γ9Audit Feesit + γ10Tax Feesit + γ11Other Feesit  
+ γjIndustryFE + γkYearFE + εit  (3) 
where:  
Misstatementit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company’s financial 
statements for the year are subsequently restated, and zero 
otherwise;  
MAit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company had an 
acquisition or a merger, and zero otherwise; 
BTMit  =  the book value of equity (CEQ) divided by the market value of 
equity (CSHO x PRCC_F); 
Leverageit = total liabilities scaled by total assets; 
FINit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company issued more 
than $10 million of debt or equity during the year, and zero 
otherwise; and 
all other variables have been previously defined and are also defined in Appendix A. I include 
year and industry fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by company (Petersen 
2009). I winsorize all continuous variables at plus and minus one percent. Given that knowledge 
spillover may exists between the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit, I expect the 
coefficient for SameAU to be negative. I include all company and financial statement audit-
related variables at time t and all benefit plan related variables at time t-1 given that the benefit 
plan audit typically occurs after the financial statement audit and so any potential knowledge 
spillover from the benefit plan audit to the financial statement audit would likely follow the 
example in Figure 1. 
 Using Paterson and Valencia’s (2011) misstatement model, I control for various company 
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and auditor characteristics that are likely to affect the occurrence of a misstatement. Paterson and 
Valencia (2011) provide this model as an alternative to Kinney et al.’s (2004) misstatement 
model that only controlled for size. I do not control for audit-related fees or benefit fees since 
there is likely to be a mechanical relation between these types of fees and my variable of interest 
(SameAU).   
 I add control variables to model (3) in order to ensure that my results are robust. I 
include audit firm characteristics from Francis et al. (2013). I also add control variables from 
Lobo and Zhao’s (2013) restatement risk model. Thus, I estimate the following logistic 
regression where my dependent variable is Misstatementit: 
Misstatementit = δ0 + δ1SameAUit-1 + δ2Sizeit + δ3MAit + δ4BTMit + δ5Leverageit + δ6FINit  
+ δ7Lossit + δ8BigNit + δ9Audit Feesit + δ10Tax Feesit + δ11Other Feesit  
+ δ12Switchit + δ13Influenceit + δ14National_Leaderit + δ15City_Leaderit 
+ δ16Total_Accrualit + δ17ChangeRECit + δ18ChangeINVit + δ19Soft_Assetsit  
+ δ20ChangeSALEit + δ21ChangeROAit + δ22ChangeEMPit + δ23Leaseit  
+ δ24ABRETit + δ25LagABRETit +  δjIndustryFE + δkYearFE + εit  (4) 
where:  
Switchit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company changes its 
financial statement auditor, and zero otherwise; 
Influenceit = the sum of a company’s audit and audit-related fees divided by the 
total audit and audit-related fees received by the local audit office; 
National_Leaderit = an indicator variable set equal to one if an audit firm is the 
number one audit firm in an industry in terms of aggregated audit 
fees for a specific fiscal year, and zero otherwise; 
City_Leaderit =  an indicator variable set equal to one if an audit firm office is the 
number one audit firm in terms of aggregated client audit fees in 
an industry within that city for a specific fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise; 
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Total_Accrualit = the change in noncash assets from year t-1 to year t divided by 
average total assets where noncash assets equal (ATt – CHEt) – 
(LTt + PSTKt); 
ChangeRECit = the change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t; 
ChangeINVit = the change in inventory from year t-1 to year t; 
Soft_Assetsit = the sum of soft assets (ATt – PPENTt – CHEt) scaled by total 
assets; 
ChangeSaleit = the percentage change in cash sales where cash sales equal sales 
less the change in receivables from year t-1 to year t; 
ChangeROAit = the change in ROA from year t-1 to year t where ROA is 
measured as the return (IB) on lagged total assets (ATt-1); 
ChangeEMPit = the abnormal change in employees, defined as the percentage 
change in the number of employees less the percentage change in 
total assets [(EMPt – EMPt-1)/EMPt-1] – [(ATt – ATt-1)/ATt-1]; 
Leaseit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s future 
operating lease obligations are greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise; 
ABRETit = the annual buy-and-hold stock return less annual buy-and-hold 
value weighted NYSE-AMEX-NASD index return; 
LagABRETit = ABRET lagged by one year; and 
all other variables have been previously defined and are also defined in Appendix A. I include 
year and industry fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by company (Petersen 
2009). I winsorize all continuous variables at plus and minus one percent. Given that knowledge 
spillover may exists between the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit, I expect the 
coefficient for SameAU to be negative. 
I also test whether benefit plan audit complexity moderates my variable of interest, 
SameAU. To test this I modify model (3) by controlling for a specific type of benefit plan audit 
complexity and the interaction between that type of complexity and my variable of interest. I 
estimate the following logistic regression where my dependent variable is Misstatementit: 
37 
Misstatementit = λ0 + λ1SameAUit-1 + λ2Sizeit + λ3MAit + λ4BTMit + λ5Leverageit + λ6FINit  
+ λ7Lossit + λ8BigNit + λ9Audit Feesit + λ10Tax Feesit + λ11Other Feesit  
+ λ12Complexityit-1 + λ13 SameAU x Complexity + λjIndustryFE  
+ λkYearFE + εit  (5) 
where:  
Complexityit-1 = either ESOPit-1, Unionit-1, Real Estateit-1, or Joint Ventureit-1;  
SameAU x Complexity = interaction of SameAUit-1 and Complexityit-1; and 
all other variables have been previously defined and are also defined in Appendix A. I include 
year and industry fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by company (Petersen 
2009). I winsorize all continuous variables at plus and minus one percent. The coefficient λ13 
represents the mitigating effect benefit plan audit complexity has on the relation between having 
the same auditor for both the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit and audit 
quality. Given that knowledge spillover may exists between the financial statement audit and the 
benefit plan audit, I expect the coefficient for SameAU to be negative, but I expect the interaction 
term to have a positive coefficient. 
To better test the possibility of knowledge spillover, I test whether having the same audit 
firm for the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit affects specific types of 
misstatements, particularly payroll-related misstatements and debt-related misstatements. I 
choose these two categories of misstatements since these are the audit areas that are most likely 
to benefit from additional audit procedures being performed during the year. I estimate the 
following logistic regression where my dependent variable is Type of Misstatementit: 
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Type of Misstatementit = φ0 + φ1SameAUit-1 + φ2Sizeit + φ3MAit + φ4BTMit + φ5Leverageit  
+ φ6FINit + φ7Lossit + φ8BigNit + φ9Audit Feesit + φ10Tax Feesit  
+ φ11Other Feesit + φjIndustryFE + φkYearFE + εit  (6) 
where:  
Type of Misstatementit = either Payroll_Misstatementsit or Debt_Misstatementsit;  
Payroll_Misstatementsit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company’s financial 
statements for the year are subsequently restated for a payroll-
related misstatement,25 and zero otherwise; 
Debt_Misstatementsit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company’s financial 
statements for the year are subsequently restated for a debt-related 
misstatement,26 and zero otherwise; and 
all other variables have been previously defined and are also defined in Appendix A. I include 
year and industry fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by company (Petersen 
2009). I winsorize all continuous variables at plus and minus one percent. Given that knowledge 
spillover may exists between the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit, I expect the 
coefficient for SameAU to be negative. 
Benefit Plan Audit Quality and Benefit Plan Quality 
Benefit Plan Audit Quality 
In the second part of my first hypothesis (H1b), I hypothesize that engaging the same 
                                                            
25 Using the Non-Reliance Restatement database in Audit Analytics, I categorize expense 
restatements (7), liabilities restatements (12), stock based compensation restatements (17), 
deferred stock restatements (39 and 48), and pension restatements (11) as payroll-related 
restatements since the payroll transaction cycle general includes compensation expense, payroll 
accruals, and additional types of compensation (i.e. stock based or deferred stock). I include 
pension restatements since pensions are another type of benefit plan. 
26 Using the Non-Reliance Restatement database in Audit Analytics, I categorize debt, quasi-
debt, warrants and equity security issues restatements (4), debt and/or equity classification issues 
restatements (26), loan covenant violations/issues restatements (27), and financial statement, 
footnote, and segment disclosure restatements (36) as debt-related restatements since these types 
of restatements are all closely related to the debt transaction cycle and the financial reporting of 
debt-related transactions. 
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audit firm for the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit is positively associated with 
benefit plan audit quality, I estimate the following logistic regression: 
BenefitPlanAuditQualityit  = θ0 + θ1SameAUit + θ2Sizeit + θ3Growthit + θ4ChangeEMPit  
+ θ5Lossit + θ6BigN_bpit + θ7Influenceit + θ8BenefitPlanCitySpecialistit  
+ θ9AuditTenure_bpit + θ10Busy_bpit + θ11Number_of_Plansit  
+ θ12Days_bw_opinionsit + θ13Unionit + θ14Real Estateit + θ15Joint Venturesit  
+ θ16ESOPit + θjIndustryFE + θkYearFE + εit  (7) 
where:  
BenefitPlanAuditQualityit   = either BP_Restatementsit or Late Filingsit;  
BP_Restatementsit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company discloses in its 
11-K filing that its benefit plan’s financial statements have been 
restated, and zero otherwise; 
Late Filingit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan audit was filed more than 180 days after the benefit plan’s 
year-end, and zero otherwise;  
BigN_bpit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company engages a Big 
N audit firm for its benefit plan audit, and zero otherwise; 
BenefitPlanCitySpecialistit = an indicator variable set equal to one if an audit firm audits at 
least 30 percent of the benefit plans (as evidenced by 11-K 
filings) for a given city and year provided that the audit firm 
audits more than one benefit plan for that same city and year, and 
zero otherwise; 
AuditTenure_bpit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company engages an 
audit firm for its benefit plan audit for three years or less, and zero 
otherwise; and 
all other variables have been previously defined and are also defined in Appendix A. I include 
year fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by company (Petersen 2009). I do not 
include industry fixed effects since my dependent variable is benefit plan-related and benefit 
plans and their audits generally do not vary by industry. I winsorize all continuous variables at 
plus and minus one percent. Given that knowledge spillover may exists between the benefit plan 
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audit and the financial statement audit, I expect the coefficient for SameAU to be negative. I 
include all variables at time t given that the financial statement audit typically occurs prior to the 
benefit plan audit and so the knowledge spillover would likely follow the example in Figure 2. 
 I include variables that might affect the likelihood of a benefit plan restatement or a late 
filing. I include the company characteristics of size, growth, change in number of employees, and 
loss like I included in model (1). A larger company may have better benefit plan financial 
reporting qualities and thus less likely to have restatements or late filings. On the other hand a 
larger company may also have more overhead or a decentralized payroll process which might be 
associated with a high likelihood of restatements or late filings. A company with high growth, 
significant change in employees, or loss might be less likely to be associated with a high level of 
benefit plan financial reporting quality and so more likely to have restatements or late filings. 
However, given the lack of prior research on benefit plan audit quality or benefit plan financial 
reporting quality, it is unclear what the predication of the control variables should be in these 
models.  
I include BigN_bp and Influence as potential audit-related characteristics that might affect 
the likelihood of benefit plan restatements or late filings. Given that the Big N are associated 
with higher audit quality, it seems reasonable to predict that the Big N would also have higher 
audit quality for benefit plan audits. On the other hand, if all audit firms have similar benefit plan 
audit characteristics, then it is not certain that having a Big N audit firm for the benefit plan will 
improve the audit quality of the benefit plan.  
I measure benefit plan expertise based on the number of benefit plans for a particular city 
and year. I use the number of benefit plans rather than benefit plan fees since benefit plan fees 
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are unavailable.27 Even though prior literature uses industry in their measure of audit firm 
expertise (Francis et al. 2013; Francis and Yu 2009), I do not use industry in the measure of 
benefit plan expertise since benefit plan audits are very similar across industries with no industry 
related differences. The DOL, in a brochure to benefit plan administrators, discusses whether a 
benefit plan auditor should have experience in auditing employee benefit plans (DOL 2011). The 
DOL (2011, 3) states that: 
One of the most common reasons for deficient accountants’ reports is the failure of the 
auditor to perform tests in areas unique to employee benefit plan audits. The more 
training and experience that an auditor has with employee benefit plan audits, the more 
familiar the auditor will be with benefit plan practices and operations, as well as the 
special auditing standards and rules that apply to such plans. 
 
Given that the DOL considers experience with employee benefit plan audits important in 
mitigating audit deficiencies, I would expect benefit plan city specialist to be associated 
with a lower likelihood of restatements and late filings. Likewise, if longer tenure provides 
additional experience with a benefit plan, I expect short tenure of benefit plan auditors 
(Audit Tenure_bp) to be associated with a higher likelihood of benefit plan restatements 
and late filings. I also include proxies for benefit plan audit busyness and benefit plan 
audit complexity which might be negatively associated with benefit plan audit quality. I 
exclude one of my proxies for busyness, Days_bw_opinions, when I estimate model (6) 
with Late Filings as my dependent variable. I exclude this control variable because of the 
possibility of a mechanical relation between more days between the opinions and having a 
late filings. Even though there seems to be a logical expectation for the sign of some of the 
                                                            
27 Benefit plan audit fees are not required to be disclosed separately from other “audit-related” 
services disclosed by the company when the company discloses audit fees paid to the principal 
auditor. Also fees are not required to be disclosed when they are paid to an accounting firm that 
is not their principal auditor. Benefit plan audit fees are not disclosed in the 11-K filing. 
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coefficients in this model, I use two-tailed tests since this model is more exploratory in 
nature. 
Benefit Plan Quality 
To further consider the possible outcomes of engaging the same audit firm for the 
financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit, I test its association with benefit plan quality. 
I estimate the following logistic regression: 
BenefitPlanQualityit  = θ0 + θ1SameAUit + θ2Sizeit + θ3Growthit + θ4ChangeEMPit  
+ θ5Lossit + θ6BigN_bpit + θ7Influenceit + θ8BenefitPlanCitySpecialistit  
+ θ9AuditTenure_bpit + θ10Busy_bpit + θ11Number_of_Plansit  
+ θ12Days_bw_opinionsit + θ13Unionit + θ14Real Estateit + θ15Joint Venturesit  
+ θ16ESOPit + θjIndustryFE + θkYearFE + εit  (8) 
where:  
BenefitPlanQualityit   = either ExciseTaxit or EBSAit;  
ExciseTaxit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company discloses in its 
11-K filing that it has paid excise taxes or had a late submission of 
participant contribution,28 and zero otherwise; 
EBSAit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan has an EBSA fine, and zero otherwise; and 
all other variables have been previously defined and are also defined in Appendix A. I include 
year fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by company (Petersen 2009). I do not 
include industry fixed effects since my dependent variable is benefit plan-related and benefit 
plans and their audits generally do not vary by industry. I winsorize all continuous variables at 
                                                            
28 The DOL requires that all contributions be remitted to the third party trust as soon as 
administratively feasible. This time period varies by company but can be as short as one day or 
as long as two weeks. Failure to comply with this DOL standard is generally discovered during 
the compliance testing of the audit and requires disclosure by the benefit plan and payment of 
excise tax on Form 5330.  
43 
plus and minus one percent. I include all variables at time t given that the financial statement 
audit typically occurs prior to the benefit plan audit and so the knowledge spillover would likely 
follow the example in Figure 2. I identify characteristics associated with either late contributions 
or EBSA fines and make no predictions for any of my control variables for these models. Late 
contributions and EBSA fines may proxy for benefit plan quality since a late contribution signals 
a breakdown in payroll-related controls and an EBSA fine generally results from a break down in 
benefit plan compliance. 
Characteristics of Switching Benefit Plan Auditors 
My first research question related to how the provision of benefit plan audits has changed 
over time. In univariate analysis, it seems that there has been a trend by companies to choose a 
different audit firm to provide their benefit plan audit than their financial statement audit. In 
order to understand this trend better, I test the characteristics of switching benefit plan auditors. I 
estimate the following model using a logistic regression:  
Switch_bpit = ψ0 + ψ1Sizeit + ψ2Growthit + ψ3ChangeEMPit + ψβ4Lossit + ψ5BigN_bpit-1 
+ ψ6Influenceit + ψ7Benefit Plan City Specialistit-1 + ψ8Audit Tenure_bpit-1  
+ ψ9Busy_bpit-1 + ψ10Number_of_Plansit-1 + ψ11Days_bw_opinionsit-1  
+ ψ12Unionit-1 + ψ13Real Estateit-1 + ψ14Joint Ventureit-1 + ψ15ESOPit-1  
+ ψjIndustryFE + ψkYearFE + εit  (9) 
where: 
Switch_bpit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company changes its 
benefit plan auditor, and zero otherwise; and  
all other variables have been previously defined and are also defined in Appendix A. I include 
year and industry fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by company (Petersen 
44 
2009). I winsorize all continuous variables at plus and minus one percent. Since the benefit plan 
audit fieldwork likely occurs after the financial statement audit fieldwork, I use lagged benefit 
plan related variables (BigN_bp, Benefit Plan City Specialist, Audit Tenure_bp, Busy_bp, 
Number_of_Plans, Days_bw_opinions, Union, Real Estate, Joint Venture, and ESOP). I use 
current period company related variables (Size, Growth, ChangeEMP, Loss, and Influence) since 
the financial statement audit is finished before the benefit plan audit. I have no expectations for 
these variables.  
Switching the Financial Statement Auditor 
The trend is for companies to switch away from having the same audit firm provide its 
financial statement audit and its benefit plan audit. I am interested in seeing whether having the 
same audit firm provide audit-related services is associated with switching the financial 
statement audit firm and whether switching the benefit plan audit firm is associated with 
switching the financial statement audit firm. 
Following Landsman et al.’s (2009) switching model, I estimate the following logistic 
regression. 
Switchit = ϒ0 + ϒ1Growthit-1 + ϒ2ABSDACCit-1 + ϒ3INVRECit-1 + ϒ4GCit-1 + ϒ5MODOPit-1 
+ ϒ6Audit Tenureit-1 + ϒ7ROAit-1 + ϒ8Lossit-1 + ϒ9Leverageit-1 + ϒ10Cashit-1  
+ ϒ11Mismatchit-1 + ϒ12National Leaderit-1 + ϒ13Sizeit-1 + ϒ14MAit-1  
+ ϒ14SameAUit-1 + ϒjIndustryFE + ϒkYearFE + εit  (10) 
where: 
Switchit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company changes its 
financial statement auditor, and zero otherwise; 
ABSDACCit-1 = the absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary accruals;  
INVRECit-1 = the sum of inventory and receivables divided by total assets; 
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GCit-1 = an indicator variable set equal to one if the audit opinion is a 
going concern, and zero otherwise;  
MODOPit-1 = an indicator variable set equal to one if the audit opinion is 
modified for anything other than a going concern, and zero 
otherwise;  
ROAit-1 = return on assets, measured as net income before extraordinary 
items scaled by average total assets; 
Cashit-1 = cash scaled by total assets;  
Mismatchit-1 = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company is 
mismatched with the incumbent auditor29, and zero otherwise; and 
all other variables have been previously defined and are also defined in Appendix A. I include 
year and industry fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by company (Petersen 
2009). I winsorize all continuous variables at plus and minus one percent. In following 
Landsman et al. (2009), I lag all of my independent variables since I am modeling the 
characteristics leading to the company switching its financial statement audit firm. I have no 
expectations for these control variables. I also have no expectation for my variable of interest 
(SameAU) since having the same audit firm for the financial statement audit and the benefit plan 
audit could have no effect on whether the company switches the financial statement audit firm or 
have a positive effect on whether the company switches the financial statement audit firm if 
perceived switching cost are greater. 
Once again, I follow Landsman et al.’s (2009) switching model. I modify Equation (10) 
so that my variable of interest changes from SameAU to whether the company has a new benefit 
plan audit firm (Switch_bp) indicating a prior audit firm switch. This model tests H2. 
Switchit = ϒ0 + ϒ1Growthit-1 + ϒ2ABSDACCit-1 + ϒ3INVRECit-1 + ϒ4GCit-1 + ϒ5MODOPit-1 
+ ϒ6Audit Tenureit-1 + ϒ7ROAit-1 + ϒ8Lossit-1 + ϒ9Leverageit-1 + ϒ10Cashit-1  
                                                            
29 See Shu (2000) for how this variable is constructed. 
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+ ϒ11Mismatchit-1 + ϒ12National Leaderit-1 + ϒ13Sizeit-1 + ϒ14MAit-1  
+ ϒ14Switch_bpit-1 + ϒjIndustryFE + ϒkYearFE + εit  (11) 
where all variables have been previously defined and are also defined in Appendix A. I include 
year and industry fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by company (Petersen 
2009). I winsorize all continuous variables at plus and minus one percent. In following 
Landsman et al. (2009), I lag all of my independent variables since I am modeling the 
characteristics leading to the company switching its financial statement audit firm. I have no 
expectations for the control variables. I also have no prediction for the coefficient on my variable 
of interest (Switch_bp) since switching the benefit plan audit firm could have no effect on 
whether the company switches the financial statement audit firm or have a positive (negative) 
effect on whether the company switches the financial statement audit firm if perceived switching 
cost are greater (less) than actual switching cost. 
V. RESULTS 
Characteristics of the Same Audit Firm Providing Audit and Audit-Related Services 
In addressing my second research question, I test the characteristics of choosing the same 
audit firm for both the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit.30 Table 3 displays my 
results. Panel A shows the results using my full sample. I present the results of modeling 
Equation (1) in Column (1) of Panel A. I find that larger companies are more likely to have the 
same audit firm for both assurance services. I find that companies experiencing growth, engaging 
BigN audit firms for the financial statement audits, having shorter tenure with their financial 
statement auditor, and paying lower other fees are associated with a lower likelihood of having 
                                                            
30 I address my first research question (How has the provision of benefit plan audit services 
changed over time?) in Section III and then further test this research question by exploring the 
characteristics of switching the benefit plan auditor found later in this section. 
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the same audit firm provide both assurance services. In column (2), I add benefit plan control 
variables in order to model Equation (2). I find that my results from the first column still hold 
with the additional variables. I find no associations with benefit plan characteristics and engaging 
the same audit firm for the financial statement audit and benefit plan audit.31 These findings 
suggest that company size, growth, type of auditor, audit tenure (or the lack thereof), and other 
fees are associated with the decision of companies to choose the financial statement auditor as 
the benefit plan auditor.  
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
Panel B of Table 3, presents the results of Equation (2) using Form 5500 data. I estimate 
the variables Union, Real Estate, and Joint Venture using two different methods, hand collecting 
the information from the 11-K filings and using the information from the Form 5500 available 
from the DOL. The benefit of using the 11-K filings is that I can determine whether an indicator 
variable should be coded as one or zero for each company-year observation in my entire sample 
period. The limitation of using the 11-K filings is that I am limited based on what the company 
chooses to disclose since this information is not mandated to be disclosed. The benefit of the 
Form 5500 information is that it is from an informational IRS tax form so that there is no 
ambiguity when a benefit plan selects that it has a collective bargaining agreement (Union) or 
chooses not to select a collective bargaining agreement. Unfortunately, there was a change in 
how data was recorded by the DOL from 2008 to 2009 and so the Form 5500 data is for a 
reduced sample period of 2009 through 2012. I find statistically similar results whether I 
estimate Equation (2) using the Form 5500 data (Column (1)) or the hand collected data from the 
                                                            
31 I considered adding plan size measured as the log of benefit plan assets; however, benefit plan 
assets are highly correlated with company size (using assets as a measure). In untabulated results, 
the correlation between these variables is 0.85 and significant (p-value < 0.01) 
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same time period (Column (2)). Overall, the results of Panel B support my findings in Panel A of 
Table 3. It appears that having the same audit firm provide the financial statement audit and the 
benefit plan audit is positively associated with larger companies and negatively associated with 
growth companies, companies reporting a loss, companies with a Big N financial statement 
auditor, and companies with a short tenure with their financial statement auditor. 
Audit Knowledge Spillover – Benefit Plan Audit to the Financial Statement Audit 
Misstatements 
To test my Hypothesis 1a, I present the relation between engaging the same audit firm for 
both the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit in the prior period and the likelihood 
of misstatements in Table 4. Column (1) presents the results of Equation (3) which follows 
Paterson and Valencia (2011). When either the company’s financial statement audit firm or the 
company’s benefit plan audit firm change, the potential benefit of having the same audit firm for 
the benefit plan may not be realized. To address this potential concern, I remove observations 
where the company changes its financial statement audit firm or its benefit plan audit firm during 
the year or during the previous year. In column (2), I condition the observation on not having a 
financial statement auditor switch or a benefit plan auditor switch in the current or preceding 
year. In both estimations, my variable of interest, SameAU is negative and significant (p-value < 
0.05). This finding suggests that having the same auditor provide the financial statement audit 
and the benefit plan audit in the prior period is associated with a lower likelihood of misstating 
the financial statements.  
I extend my misstatement model by adding additional auditor and audit-firm controls 
from Francis et al. (2013) and Lobo and Zhao (2013). Panel B of Table 4 presents the results of 
estimating Equation (4). In column (1), I use the available sample for the control variables 
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selected. In column (2), I restrict my sample observations without an auditor change or a benefit 
plan auditor change in the current or prior period. In both estimations, my variable of interest, 
SameAU is negative and significant (p-value < 0.05). I find that companies choosing the same 
audit firm for its financial statement audit and its benefit plan audit in the previous year are less 
likely to have misstatements in the current year.  
I present my results of estimating Equation (5) in Panel C of Table 4. In this Panel, I add 
benefit plan complexity and the interaction term between benefit plan complexity and my 
variable of interest SameAU to investigate whether benefit plan complexity might affect the 
relation between my variable of interest and the likelihood of misstatements. I find no effect on 
the likelihood of misstatements in any estimation of benefit plan complexity. Adding the 
additional control and interaction does not change my overall finding that in all estimations, my 
variable of interest, SameAU is negative and significant (p-value < 0.05). 
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
Payroll-Related Misstatements 
To further investigate the possibility of knowledge spillover, I test whether having the 
same audit firm provide the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit in the prior 
period is associated with the likelihood of payroll-related misstatements. In Section II, I argued 
that the payroll transaction cycle was a specific area where knowledge spillover between the 
benefit plan audit and the financial statement audit might occur. I present my findings in Panel A 
of Table 5. In Column (1), I restrict my sample to not having any other type of misstatement so 
that the relation between SameAU and the likelihood of payroll-related misstatement is clear. I 
find that SameAU is negative and significant (p-value < 0.05). In Column (2), I further restrict 
my sample to remove observations where the financial statement auditor or the benefit plan 
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auditor changed during the current or previous year and find that SameAU is negative and 
significant (p-value < 0.01). This finding suggests that having the same audit firm perform the 
benefit plan audit and the financial statement audit in the prior period lowers the likelihood of 
payroll-related misstatements. 
I add benefit plan complexity in Panel B of Table 5 to see if benefit plan complexity 
moderates my finding that SameAU is associated with a lower likelihood of payroll-related 
misstatements. I find no effect on the likelihood of payroll-related misstatements in any 
estimation of benefit plan complexity. Adding the additional control and interaction does not 
change my overall finding that in all estimations, my variable of interest, SameAU is negative 
and significant (p-value < 0.05). 
[Insert Table 5 here.] 
Debt-Related Misstatements 
Additionally, I investigate the possibility of knowledge spillover in the debt-transaction 
cycle. In Section II, I argued that the debt transaction cycle was another specific area where 
knowledge spillover between the benefit plan audit and the financial statement audit might occur. 
I present my findings in Panel A of Table 6. In Column (1), I restrict my sample to not having 
any other type of misstatement so that the relation between SameAU and the likelihood of debt-
related misstatement is clear. I find that SameAU is negative and significant (p-value < 0.05). In 
Column (2), I further restrict my sample to remove observations where the financial statement 
auditor or the benefit plan auditor changed during the current or previous year and find that 
SameAU is negative and significant (p-value < 0.05). This finding suggests that having the same 
audit firm perform the benefit plan audit and the financial statement audit in the prior period 
lowers the likelihood of debt-related misstatements. 
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I add benefit plan complexity in Panel B of Table 6 to see if benefit plan complexity 
moderates my finding that SameAU is associated with a lower likelihood of debt-related 
misstatements. In particular, I am interested in whether or not having an ESOP will be related to 
debt-related misstatements since one of the complexities of ESOPS is the ability of the benefit 
plan to have debt. I find no effect on the likelihood of debt-related misstatements in any 
estimation of benefit plan complexity. Adding the additional control and interaction does not 
change my overall finding that in all estimations, my variable of interest, SameAU is negative 
and significant (p-value < 0.05). 
[Insert Table 6 here.] 
Overall, these findings support H1a that audit quality is positively associated with 
engaging the same financial statement audit firm and benefit plan audit firm. These findings 
suggests that knowledge spillover exists for audit-related services rather than an impairment of 
auditor independence.  
Audit Knowledge Spillover –Financial Statement Audit to the Benefit Plan Audit 
Benefit Plan Audit Quality 
In Table 7, I estimate Equation (7) and test H1b that benefit plan audit quality is 
positively associated with engaging the same financial statement audit firm and benefit plan 
audit firm. In Column (1), I find that SameAU is not associated with benefit plan restatements 
(although the coefficient is negative). In Column (2), I find that SameAU is associated with a 
higher likelihood of the benefit plan having a late filing. I find no evidence or support for H1b; 
however, these model estimations are exploratory and so it may be an area for future research. 
[Insert Table 7 here.] 
Benefit Plan Financial Reporting Quality 
52 
In Table 8, I estimate Equation (8) and test whether benefit plan financial reporting 
quality is positively associated with engaging the same financial statement audit firm and benefit 
plan audit firm. In Column (1), I find that SameAU is not associated with excise taxes or late 
contributions. In Column (2), I find that SameAU is not associated with a likelihood of the 
benefit plan having an EBSA fine. I develop a better understanding of the characteristics of the 
benefit plan, the audit firm, and the company that are associated with my measures of benefit 
plan financial reporting quality. In Column (1), I find that companies with a higher change in 
employees, more plans, and have a unionized workforce are more likely to have late 
contributions. This finding suggests certain types of administrative complexities (i.e. change in 
employees, greater number of plans, and a collective bargaining agreement) may increase the 
likelihood of a breakdown in the benefit plan financial reporting quality. In Column (2), my 
findings have significant limitations given the low number of EBSA fines in my sample. It seems 
that public companies that provide their own stock as an investment option for their benefit plan 
participants are overall not very likely to receive an EBSA fine. 
[Insert Table 8 here.] 
Benefit Plan Auditor Switching 
To further test my first research question regarding how the provision for audit-related 
services has changed over time, I estimate Equation (9) to better understand the trend for 
companies to switch away from having the same audit firm provide both the financial statement 
audit and the benefit plan audit. I present my results in Table 9. Panel A and B present the 
descriptive statistics of my estimation. In Panel A, I condition my sample on having had the 
same audit firm for the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit in the prior period. In 
Panel B, I condition my sample on having different audit firms opine on the financial statement 
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audit and the benefit plan audit in the prior period. I use these two different restrictions to better 
understand the characteristics of switching. I present the results of the regression in Panel C. In 
column (1) of Panel C, I find that companies who are smaller, report a loss, have previously had 
a Big N benefit plan auditor, and have more complex benefit plans are more likely to switch their 
benefit plan auditor provided that they had the same audit firm providing the financial statement 
audit and the benefit plan audit in the prior time period. In column (2) of Panel C, I find that 
companies who experience growth, have a change in employees, had previously had a Big N 
benefit plan auditor, do not have a benefit plan city specialist, and have had their benefit plan 
audit firm for greater than three years are more likely to switch their benefit plan auditor 
provided they had different audit firms provide the financial statement audit and the benefit plan 
audit in the prior time period. I think it is interesting that the characteristics of firms switching 
their benefit plan audit firm varies depending on whether the company had the same or different 
audit firms provide the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit. One characteristic 
that remains significant in both specifications is the trend for companies to switch away from 
their Big N benefit plan audit firm. This finding suggests that companies are more likely to be 
cost conscious when it comes to their benefit plan provider.  
[Insert Table 9 here.] 
Financial Statement Auditor Switching 
In Panel A of Table 10, I present the descriptive statistics of the observations remaining 
after I require data for the independent variables in the Landsman et al. (2009) switching model. 
I find similar results to the descriptive statistics in Table 2. Fifty-eight percent of my sample has 
the same auditor provide the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit. Seven percent 
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of my sample switches their benefit plan auditor. Two percent of my sample switches its 
financial statement audit firm.  
Having the Same Audit Firm for the Financial Statement Audit and the Benefit Plan Audit 
 In Table 10, Panel B, I present the results of estimating Equation (9). I find having the 
same auditor provide the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit is associated with a 
lower likelihood of switching the financial statement auditor (p-value<0.01). In column (2), I 
restrict my sample to companies that have not switched their benefit plan audit firm in the 
current or prior year and find similar results. This finding suggests that perhaps the perceived 
switching cost are higher for firms that have the same auditor for their financial statement audit 
and their benefit plan audit. 
Selecting a New Benefit Plan Audit Firm 
In Table 10, Panel C, I present the results of estimating Equation (10). I find having that a 
new benefit plan audit firm in the prior period is associated with a higher likelihood of switching 
the financial statement auditor (p-value<0.05). This finding suggests that perhaps the perceived 
switching cost are lower for firms that have switched their benefit plan audit firm and they are 
more willing to also switch their financial statement audit firm. Thus, I reject my second 
hypothesis that there is not association between switching the financial statement auditor and 
switching the benefit plan auditor. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this study, I provide market evidence of the distinct shifts in the use of the same audit 
firm for both the financial statement audit and other audit-related services over time. I also 
investigate the characteristics of choosing the same audit firm for an auxiliary service. And then, 
I test whether having the same audit firm for both the financial statement audit and the benefit 
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plan audit in a prior period affects audit quality as measured using misstatements (an indication 
of knowledge spillover). Alternatively, I test whether the flow of knowledge spillover works in 
the other direction, from the financial statement audit to the benefit plan audit. I also test the 
trend for companies switching away from having the same audit firm provide their financial 
statement audit and benefit plan audit by testing the characteristics of benefit plan audit switches 
and financial statement audit switches. 
I find that the percentage of companies engaging the same audit firm for both the 
financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit has declined from 2004 to 2012. I find that 
larger companies are more likely to engage the same audit firm for financial statement audits and 
benefit plan audits. I also find that engaging the same audit firm in the prior period is associated 
with a lower likelihood of misstatement, payroll-related misstatements, and debt-related 
misstatements. I find that benefit plan complexity does not affect the likelihood of financial 
statement misstatements. I find that the direction of knowledge spillover appears to be one 
direction, from the benefit plan audit to the financial statement audit. These findings suggest that 
using the same assurance provider for an auxiliary service improves audit quality or provides 
knowledge spillover rather than impairing auditor independence. My findings suggest that an 
unintended consequence of SOX may be that audit committees choose the perception of auditor 
independence over the potential knowledge spillover gained from audit-related services. 
I also find that having the same audit firm for both the financial statement audit and the 
benefit plan audit is associated with a lower likelihood of switching the financial statement audit 
firm while switching the benefit plan audit firm is associated with a higher likelihood of 
switching the financial statement audit firm. These findings suggests that audit-related services 
may have more effect on the financial statement audit than just knowledge spillover and that who 
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is providing the audit-related services and whether or not that provider has changed affects the 
perception of switching costs for the financial statement audit. 
I contribute to the research on nonaudit services by documenting the relation between the 
choice of service provider of a specific type of nonaudit service and audit quality. I also 
contribute to the literature by exploring a new data set. I expect that my findings will be of 
interest to other researchers and regulators concerned with nonaudit services.   
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SameAUit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company engages the 
same audit firm for its benefit plan audit and financial statement 
audit, and zero otherwise 
BP_Restatementsit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company discloses in its 
11-K filing that its benefit plan’s financial statements have been 
restated, and zero otherwise 
Debt_Misstatementsit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company’s financial 
statements for the year are subsequently restated for a debt-related 
misstatement,32 and zero otherwise 
EBSAit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan has an EBSA fine, and zero otherwise 
ExciseTaxit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company discloses in its 
11-K filing that it has paid excise taxes or had a late submission of 
participant contribution,33 and zero otherwise 
Late Filingit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan audit was filed more than 180 days after the benefit plan’s 
year-end, and zero otherwise 
Misstatementit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company’s financial 
statements for the year are subsequently restated, zero otherwise 
                                                            
32 Using the Non-Reliance Restatement database in Audit Analytics, I categorize debt, quasi-
debt, warrants and equity security issues restatements (4), debt and/or equity classification issues 
restatements (26), loan covenant violations/issues restatements (27), and financial statement, 
footnote, and segment disclosure restatements (36) as debt-related restatements since these types 
of restatements are all closely related to the debt transaction cycle and the financial reporting of 
debt-related transactions. 
33 The DOL requires that all contributions be remitted to the third party trust as soon as 
administratively feasible. This time period varies by company but can be as short as one day or 
as long as two weeks. Failure to comply with this DOL standard is generally discovered during 
the compliance testing of the audit and requires disclosure by the benefit plan and payment of 
excise tax on Form 5330.  
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Payroll_Misstatementsit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company’s financial 
statements for the year are subsequently restated for a payroll-
related misstatement,34 and zero otherwise 
Switchit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company changes its 
financial statement auditor, and zero otherwise 
Switch_bpit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company changes its 
benefit plan auditor, and zero otherwise 
Other Variables 
DifferentAUit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company engages a 
different audit firm for its benefit plan audit than for its financial 
statement audit, and zero otherwise 
Control Variables 
ABRETit = the annual buy-and-hold stock return less annual buy-and-hold 
value weighted NYSE-AMEX-NASD index return 
ABSDACCit-1 = the absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary accruals 
Audit Feesit = the natural log of audit fees 
Audit Tenureit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company has engaged its 
financial statement auditor for three years or less 
AuditTenure_bpit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company engages an 
audit firm for its benefit plan audit for three years or less, and zero 
otherwise 
BenefitPlanCitySpecialistit = an indicator variable set equal to one if an audit firm audits at 
least 30 percent of the benefit plans (as evidenced by 11-K 
filings) for a given city and year provided that the audit firm 
audits more than one benefit plan for that same city and year, and 
zero otherwise 
BigNit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company engages a Big 
N audit firm for its financial statement audit, and zero otherwise35 
                                                            
34 Using the Non-Reliance Restatement database in Audit Analytics, I categorize expense 
restatements (7), liabilities restatements (12), stock based compensation restatements (17), 
deferred stock restatements (39 and 48), and pension restatements (11) as payroll-related 
restatements since the payroll transaction cycle general includes compensation expense, payroll 
accruals, and additional types of compensation (i.e. stock based or deferred stock). I include 
pension restatements since pensions are another type of benefit plan. 
35 Big N refers to Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
 
64 
BigN_bpit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company engages a Big 
N audit firm for its benefit plan audit, and zero otherwise 
BTMit  =  the book value of equity (CEQ) divided by the market value of 
equity (CSHO x PRCC_F) 
Busy_bpit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan audit opinion is signed during the months of January through 
March, and zero otherwise 
 
Cashit-1 = cash scaled by total assets 
ChangeEMPit = the abnormal change in employees, defined as the percentage 
change in the number of employees less the percentage change in 
total assets [(EMPt – EMPt-1)/EMPt-1] – [(ATt – ATt-1)/ATt-1] 
ChangeINVit = the change in inventory from year t-1 to year t 
ChangeRECit = the change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t 
ChangeROAit = the change in ROA from year t-1 to year t where ROA is 
measured as the return (IB) on lagged total assets (ATt-1) 
ChangeSaleit = the percentage change in cash sales where cash sales equal sales 
less the change in receivables from year t-1 to year t 
City_Leaderit =  an indicator variable set equal to one if an audit firm office is the 
number one audit firm in terms of aggregated client audit fees in 
an industry within that city for a specific fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise 
Days_bw_opinionsit =  the natural log of the number of days between the signature date 
of the company’s financial statement audit opinion and the 
signature date of the company’s benefit plan audit opinion 
ESOPit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan discloses in its 11-K filing that it has an employee stock 
ownership plan or an ESOP 
FINit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company issued more 
than $10 million of debt or equity during the year, and zero 
otherwise 
GCit-1 = an indicator variable set equal to one if the audit opinion is a 
going concern, and zero otherwise;  
Growthit = the percentage change in total assets 
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Influenceit = the sum of a company’s audit and audit-related fees divided by 
the total audit and audit-related fees received by the local audit 
office 
INVRECit-1 = the sum of inventory and receivables divided by total assets 
Joint Ventureit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan discloses in its 11-K filing that it has joint venture 
investments 
Joint Venture_5500it = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company reports an 
ending asset balance associated with a joint venture, and zero 
otherwise (Form 5500) 
LagABRETit = ABRET lagged by one year 
Leaseit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s future 
operating lease obligations are greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise 
Leverageit = total liabilities scaled by total assets 
Lossit =  an indicator variable set equal to one if the company reports net 
income less than zero, and zero otherwise 
MAit = an indicator variable set equal to one if a company had an 
acquisition or a merger, and zero otherwise 
Mismatchit-1 = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company is 
mismatched with the incumbent auditor36, and zero otherwise 
MODOPit-1 = an indicator variable set equal to one if the audit opinion is 
modified for anything other than a going concern, and zero 
otherwise 
National_Leaderit = an indicator variable set equal to one if an audit firm is the 
number one audit firm in an industry in terms of aggregated audit 
fees for a specific fiscal year, and zero otherwise 
Number_of_Plansit =  the natural log of the number of benefit plans of a company 
Other Feesit = the natural logarithm of Other Fees 
Real Estateit =  an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan discloses in its 11-K filing that it has real estate investments 
                                                            
36 See Shu (2000) for how this variable is constructed. 
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Real Estate_5500it =  an indicator variable set equal to one if the company reports an 
ending asset balance associated with real estate, and zero 
otherwise (Form 5500) 
ROAit-1 = return on assets, measured as net income before extraordinary 
items scaled by average total assets 
Sizeit = the natural log of total assets 
Soft_Assetsit = the sum of soft assets (ATt – PPENTt – CHEt) scaled by total 
assets 
Tax Feesit = the natural logarithm of Tax-related Fees 
Total_Accrualit = the change in noncash assets from year t-1 to year t divided by 
average total assets where noncash assets equal (ATt – CHEt) – 
(LTt + PSTKt) 
Unionit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan discloses in its 11-K filing that it is subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement 
Union_5500it = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s benefit 
plan has unionized participants, and zero otherwise (Form 5500) 
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TABLE 1  
Sample Selection 
Panel A:  Number of Observations  
Company-years in Benefit Plan Opinions (an Audit Analytics database) 
from 2004 through 2012 11,641 
Less observations not in Compustat (596) 
Less observations due to missing variables for the control variables (1,833) 
Less observations where the company’s benefit plan audit opinion is signed 
before or on the same day as the financial statement audit opinion (411) 
Final Sample 8,801*
*Representing 1,470 unique companies 
Panel B:  Observations by Year 
Fiscal Year N % 
2004  1,056  12.00% 
2005  1,054  11.98% 
2006  1,049  11.92% 
2007  1,008  11.45% 
2008     994  11.29% 
2009     968  11.00% 
2010     899  10.21% 
2011     905  10.28% 
2012     868  9.85% 
Total   8,801 100% 
 
Panel C:  Observations by Fama French 12 Industry 
Industry N % 
Consumer nondurables 413 4.69% 
Consumer durables 242 2.75% 
Manufacturing 1,185 13.46% 
Energy 352 4.00% 
Chemicals 329 3.74% 
Business Equipment 838 9.52% 
Telecommunication 227 2.58% 
Utilities 614 6.98% 
Wholesale and Retail 790 8.98% 
Healthcare 443 5.03% 
Financial  2,446 27.79% 
Other 922 10.48% 
Total 8,801 100% 
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Table 1, Cont. 
 Sample Selection 
Panel D – Frequency of Signature Date of Benefit Plan Opinions by Month and Year 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
January 5 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 11 
February 5 7 6 4 4 5 6 4 4 45 
March 16 16 13 17 12 12 8 10 11 115 
April 30 18 7 6 6 7 7 6 5 92 
May 156 127 16 19 20 15 21 15 22 411 
June 761 811 929 904 901 891 819 833 764 7,613 
July 38 31 43 22 22 10 15 13 41 235 
August 7 7 6 3 5 4 1 3 1 37 
September 9 14 7 10 9 5 9 6 6 75 
October 6 3 5 4 3 6 2 2 2 33 
November 7 4 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 24 
December 16 14 14 17 11 10 9 10 9 110 





Descriptive Statistics and Selected Correlations 
Panel A:  Selected Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
25% Median 75% 
Misstatement 8,801 0.091 0.288 0 0 0
SameAU 8,801 0.592 0.491 0 1 1
Payroll Related Misstatements 8,801 0.026 0.158 0 0 0
Debt Related Misstatements 8,801 0.011 0.105 0 0 0
Benefit Plan Restatements 8,801 0.004 0.065 0 0 0
Late Filings 8,801 0.047 0.212 0 0 0
Excise Taxes/Late Contributions 8,801 0.028 0.164 0 0 0
EBSA Fine 8,801 0.001 0.038 0 0 0
Audit Fees (log) 8,801 14.331 1.432 13.503 14.315 15.230
Audit Tenure 8,801 12.907 10.833 5 9 18
Auditor Change 8,801 0.033 0.179 0 0 0
Auditor Change_bp 8,801 0.074 0.262 0 0 0
BenefitPlanCitySpecialist 8,741 0.347 0.476 0 0 1
BigN 8,801 0.845 0.362 1 1 1
BigN_bp 8,801 0.496 0.500 0 0 1
BTM 8,801 0.653 0.584 0.332 0.532 0.811
Busy_bp 8,801 0.039 0.192 0 0 0
ChangeEMP 8,801 -0.049 0.204 -0.106 -0.038 0.024
City_Leader 8,801 0.676 0.468 0 1 1
Days_bw_opinions 8,801 121.605 58.151 102 116 123
Days_bw_opinions (log) 8,801 4.719 0.444 4.635 4.762 4.820
ESOP 8,801 0.205 0.403 0 0 0
FIN 8,801 0.790 0.407 1 1 1
Influence 8,801 0.052 0.117 0.004 0.013 0.038
Joint Venture 8,801 0.013 0.114 0 0 0
Joint Venture_5500 2,489 0.207 0.405 0 0 0
Lease 8,801 1.000 0.018 1 1 1
Leverage 8,801 0.660 0.226 0.498 0.664 0.872
Loss 8,801 0.162 0.369 0 0 0




TABLE 2, Cont. 
Descriptive Statistics and Selected Correlations 
Panel A:  Selected Descriptive Statistics, Cont. 
Variables N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
25% Median 75% 
MA 8,801 0.961 0.194 1 1 1
National_Leader 8,801 0.309 0.462 0 0 1
Number of Benefit Plans 8,801 1.404 1.005 1 1 1
Number of Benefit Plans (log) 8,801 0.826 0.266 0.693 0.693 0.693
Other Fees (log) 8,801 3.568 4.856 0 0 8.445
Real Estate 8,801 0.149 0.356 0 0 0
Real Estate_5500 2,489 0.048 0.214 0 0 0
Size (log) 8,801 8.051 1.778 6.858 7.923 9.188
Soft_Assets 8,698 0.664 0.244 0.487 0.710 0.880
Tax Fees (log) 8,801 9.740 4.901 9.616 11.385 12.858
Tenure_bp 8,801 4.750 2.980 2 4 7
Union 8,801 0.214 0.410 0 0 0
Union_5500 2,489 0.306 0.461 0 0 1
Note: Data from Form 5500 includes only observations of companies whose Compustat EIN 
matches the DOL’s records for the period 2009 through 2012. Definitions of the variables 
reported in this table are provided in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 2, Cont. 
Descriptive Statistics and Selected Correlations  
Panel B:  Difference in Means by SameAU 
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A.
  SameAU = 0 SameAU = 1     
Variables n mean n mean Difference 
Size 3,591 7.758 5,210 8.253 0.000 *** 
Growth 3,591 0.078 5,210 0.073 0.157   
ChangeEMP 3,591 -0.051 5,210 -0.047 0.361   
Loss 3,591 0.179 5,210 0.151 0.001 *** 
BigN 3,591 0.894 5,210 0.811 0.000 *** 
Influence 3,591 0.040 5,210 0.060 0.000 *** 
Audit Tenure 3,591 0.171 5,210 0.185 0.077 * 
Audit Fees 3,591 14.291 5,210 14.399 0.000 *** 
Tax Fees 3,591 9.490 5,210 9.912 0.000 *** 
Other Fees 3,591 3.758 5,210 3.437 0.002 *** 
Busy_bp 3,591 0.035 5,210 0.041 0.107   
Number_of_plans 3,591 0.823 5,210 0.827 0.446   




TABLE 2, Cont. 
Descriptive Statistics and Selected Correlations 
Panel C:  Selected Pearson Correlations  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 Misstatement 1.00               
2 SameAU -0.04 1.00              
3 SameAU(t-1) -0.03 0.87 1.00             
4 Audit Fees 0.02 0.04 0.05 1.00            
5 Auditor Change 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.15 1.00           
6 BigN 0.04 -0.11 -0.08 0.53 -0.17 1.00          
7 Busy_bp 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.02 1.00         
8 City_Leader 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.19 -0.04 0.12 0.00 1.00         
9 Growth  0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 1.00       
10 Influence 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.01 -0.14 0.00 0.24 -0.02 1.00      
11 Leverage -0.02 0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.04 -0.19 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.12 1.00     
12 Loss 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.28 -0.01 0.12 1.00    
13 MA -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 1.00   
14 National_Leader 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.17 -0.05 0.24 0.02 0.12 -0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.00 1.00  
15 Other Fees  0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.18 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 1.00
16 Size -0.02 0.14 0.13 0.73 -0.10 0.29 -0.01 0.18 0.04 0.14 0.31 -0.16 -0.09 0.18 0.18 1.00
17 Tax Fees 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.40 -0.12 0.22 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.10 0.14 0.27
 *Bold denotes significance at <.05 for two tailed tests. I define all variables in Appendix A. I winsorize continuous variables at the 
one and ninety-nine percent levels. Numbers along the top correspond with the numbered rows. 
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TABLE 2, Cont. 
Descriptive Statistics and Selected Correlations 










































2004 586 176 9 229 2 54 1,056
2005 607 83 7 331 0 26 1,054
2006 550 98 1 364 0 36 1,049
2007 490 97 3 378 0 40 1,008
2008 452 110 3 381 0 48 994
2009 423 116 1 380 0 48 968
2010 389 105 0 362 3 40 899
2011 382 104 1 378 1 39 905
2012 345 97 0 382 1 43 868





Characteristics of Companies Engaging the Same Audit Firm 
Panel A:  Measuring Benefit Plan Complexity using Direct Edgar Data 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. The dependent variable is 
SameAU. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively, using two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Size 0.207*** 0.000 0.231*** 0.000 
Growth -0.498*** 0.006 -0.497*** 0.006 
ChangeEMP 0.004 0.977 0.013 0.924 
Loss -0.152 0.102 -0.156* 0.094 
BigN -0.999*** 0.000 -0.994*** 0.000 
Influence 0.683 0.185 0.722 0.170 
Audit Tenure -0.329*** 0.000 -0.328*** 0.000 
Audit Fees 0.043 0.624 0.026 0.768 
Tax Fees 0.012 0.231 0.011 0.243 
Other Fees -0.027*** 0.002 -0.026*** 0.003 
Busy_bp   0.251 0.340 
Number_of_Plans   -0.311 0.167 
Days_bw_opinions   -0.126 0.257 
Union   -0.033 0.814 
Real Estate   0.178 0.181 
Joint Ventures   0.377 0.333 
ESOP   0.054 0.693 
Intercept -0.188 0.841 0.714 0.514 
Cluster by Company Yes Yes 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 8,801 8,801 
Pseudo R-squared 0.066 0.068 
Area under ROC curve 0.676 0.679 
Time Period 2004-2012 2004-2012 
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TABLE 3, Cont. 
Characteristics of Companies Engaging the Same Audit Firm 
Panel B:  Measuring Benefit Plan Complexity using Form 5500 Data 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. The dependent variable is 
SameAU. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 





 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Size 0.319*** 0.001 0.229*** 0.003 
Growth -1.074*** 0.004 -0.885*** 0.003 
ChangeEMP -0.240 0.417 0.041 0.868 
Loss -0.353** 0.020 -0.286** 0.022 
BigN -1.398*** 0.000 -1.299*** 0.000 
Influence 0.083 0.919 0.799 0.206 
Audit Tenure -0.480** 0.038 -0.294 0.107 
Audit Fees -0.015 0.915 0.106 0.375 
Tax Fees 0.019 0.210 0.011 0.380 
Other Fees -0.018 0.194 -0.033*** 0.004 
Busy_bp 0.175 0.682 0.306 0.394 
Number_of_Plans -0.189 0.555 -0.335 0.233 
Days_bw_opinions -0.291* 0.088 -0.190 0.189 
Union   -0.178 0.305 
Real Estate   0.145 0.374 
Joint Ventures   0.622 0.205 
ESOP -0.126 0.503 -0.046 0.785 
Union_5500 -0.300 0.138   
Real Estate_5500 0.684* 0.097   
Joint Ventures_5500 -0.138 0.479   
Intercept 0.720 0.663 -0.723 0.612 
Cluster by Company Yes Yes 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 2,489 3,640 
0.075 Pseudo R-squared 0.082 
Area under ROC curve 0.690 0.683 




Association between Misstatements and SameAU 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
SameAUt-1 -0.229** 0.025 -0.266** 0.024 
Size -0.217*** 0.005 -0.223*** 0.008 
MA -0.197 0.314 -0.064 0.792 
BTM 0.284*** 0.003 0.327*** 0.002 
Leverage 0.381 0.250 0.486 0.164 
FIN 0.203 0.101 0.076 0.564 
Loss 0.212 0.122 0.118 0.445 
BigN 0.365* 0.076 0.394* 0.071 
Audit Fees 0.253** 0.026 0.270** 0.032 
Tax Fees 0.010 0.411 0.007 0.580 
Other Fees 0.013 0.204 0.015 0.161 
Intercept -4.506*** 0.000 -4.930*** 0.000 
Cluster by Company Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 8,801 7,272 
Pseudo R-squared 0.035 0.038 
Area under ROC curve 0.645 0.649 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. The dependent variable is 
Misstatement. Column (2) is conditioned on the observation not having an auditor switch or a 
benefit plan auditor switch during the current or preceding year. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests when there is a 




TABLE 4, Cont. 
Association between Misstatements and SameAU 
Panel B 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
SameAUt-1 -0.213** 0.040 -0.260** 0.030 
Size -0.250*** 0.001 -0.241*** 0.004 
MA -0.226 0.257 -0.083 0.741 
BTM 0.298*** 0.004 0.338*** 0.003 
Leverage 0.513 0.116 0.617* 0.078 
FIN 0.225* 0.080 0.110 0.423 
Loss 0.185 0.203 0.098 0.558 
BigN 0.299 0.176 0.268 0.235 
Audit Fees 0.277** 0.018 0.280** 0.029 
Tax Fees 0.013 0.301 0.012 0.400 
Other Fees 0.009 0.399 0.012 0.281 
Auditor Change 0.233 0.288   
Influence 0.393 0.440 -0.016 0.974 
National_Leader 0.164 0.171 0.16 0.377 
City_Leader -0.002 0.985 0.058 0.664 
Total_Accrual 0.106 0.783 0.192 0.665 
ChangeREC -2.149* 0.096 -0.823 0.610 
ChangeINV 0.601 0.752 -0.379 0.868 
Soft_Assets -1.049*** 0.004 -1.042*** 0.006 
ChangeSALE 0.15 0.351 0.056 0.803 
ChangeROA 0.588* 0.090 0.897* 0.094 
ChangeEMP -0.274 0.292 -0.212 0.535 
Lease -0.104 0.674 -0.105 0.684 
ABRET -0.181* 0.100 -0.272* 0.067 
LagABRET -0.062 0.290 -0.003 0.966 
Intercept -3.931*** 0.001 -4.214*** 0.002 
Cluster by Company Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 8,361 6,912 
Pseudo R-squared 0.044 0.046 
Area under ROC curve 0.662 0.662 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. The dependent variable is 
Misstatement. Column (2) is conditioned on the observation not have a financial statement 
auditor switch or a benefit plan auditor switch in the current or previous year. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using one-tailed 
tests when there is a directional prediction and two-tailed tests otherwise. All variables are 




TABLE 4, Cont. 
Association between Misstatements and SameAU 
Panel C: Benefit Plan Complexity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
SameAUt-1 -0.260** 0.026 -0.283** 0.014 -0.273** 0.013 -0.276** 0.016 
Size -0.217*** 0.007 -0.212*** 0.009 -0.211*** 0.009 -0.207** 0.012 
MA -0.270 0.170 -0.264 0.179 -0.265 0.179 -0.258 0.190 
BTM 0.292*** 0.004 0.294*** 0.003 0.297*** 0.003 0.296*** 0.003 
Leverage 0.357 0.296 0.392 0.248 0.395 0.245 0.389 0.253 
FIN 0.216* 0.099 0.221* 0.093 0.220* 0.092 0.219* 0.095 
Loss 0.188 0.182 0.187 0.186 0.184 0.193 0.180 0.202 
BigN 0.369* 0.082 0.360* 0.089 0.355* 0.095 0.352* 0.097 
Audit Fees 0.222* 0.063 0.228* 0.057 0.233* 0.052 0.235** 0.047 
Tax Fees 0.014 0.272 0.015 0.254 0.015 0.255 0.014 0.257 
Other Fees 0.011 0.261 0.011 0.277 0.011 0.262 0.011 0.275 
Uniont-1 0.209 0.349       
SameAUt-1 x Uniont-1 -0.035 0.897       
Real Estatet-1   -0.086 0.737     
SameAUt-1 x Real Estatet-1   0.096 0.763     
Joint Venturest-1     -1.289 0.221   
SameAUt-1 x Joint Venturest-1     0.925 0.452   
ESOPt-1       -0.151 0.594 
SameAUt-1 x ESOPt-1       0.045 0.888 
Intercept -3.982*** 0.002 -4.074*** 0.001 -4.152*** 0.001 -4.173*** 0.001 
Cluster by Company Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 8,207 8,207 8,207 8,207 
Pseudo R-squared 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 





TABLE 4, Cont. 
Association between Misstatements and SameAU 
Panel C:  Benefit Plan Complexity, Cont. 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. The dependent variable is Misstatement. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests when there is a directional prediction and 




Association between Payroll-Related Misstatements and SameAU 
Panel A:  Payroll-Related Misstatements 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
SameAUt-1 -0.711** 0.013 -0.880*** 0.005 
Size -0.245 0.106 -0.285* 0.056 
MA -0.090 0.882 -0.215 0.725 
BTM 0.197 0.655 0.136 0.768 
Leverage 0.490 0.660 0.428 0.711 
FIN 0.052 0.883 0.121 0.758 
Loss 0.577 0.101 0.692* 0.051 
BigN 0.958 0.141 0.594 0.382 
Audit Fees 0.360 0.118 0.450** 0.047 
Tax Fees 0.010 0.795 0.007 0.855 
Other Fees 0.015 0.553 0.004 0.894 
Intercept -7.119*** 0.005 -7.852*** 0.003 
Cluster by Company Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 8,094 6,607 
Pseudo R-squared 0.120 0.124 
Area under ROC curve 0.798 0.798 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. The dependent variable is 
Payroll-Related Misstatement and the sample is conditional on the company having no other 
types of misstatements. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests when there is a directional prediction and two-tailed 




TABLE 5, Cont. 
Association between Payroll-Related Misstatements and SameAU 
Panel B: Benefit Plan Complexity 







SameAUt-1 -0.809** 0.013 -0.816** 0.016 -0.778** 0.014
Size -0.253 0.121 -0.259 0.104 -0.219 0.177
MA -0.214 0.724 -0.267 0.657 -0.149 0.806
BTM 0.041 0.941 0.053 0.902 0.064 0.908
Leverage 0.273 0.814 0.294 0.798 0.289 0.804
FIN 0.086 0.819 0.095 0.798 0.063 0.862
Loss 0.616 0.105 0.633 0.101 0.559 0.142
BigN 1.285* 0.083 1.304* 0.084 1.230* 0.100
Audit Fees 0.328 0.165 0.319 0.179 0.372 0.119
Tax Fees 0.028 0.514 0.029 0.503 0.029 0.508
Other Fees 0.006 0.833 0.006 0.838 0.006 0.815
Uniont-1 0.137 0.791     
SameAUt-1 x Uniont-1 0.087 0.913     
Real Estatet-1   0.580 0.321   
SameAUt-1 x Real Estatet-1   0.084 0.906   
ESOPt-1     -0.717 0.323
SameAUt-1 x ESOPt-1     -0.014 0.989
Intercept -6.740*** 0.010 -6.515** 0.012 -7.439*** 0.004
Cluster by Company Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 7,342 7,342 7,342 
Pseudo R-squared 0.133 0.137 0.137 
Area under ROC curve 0.809 0.813 0.812 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. The dependent variable is 
Payroll-Related Misstatement and the sample is conditional on the company having no other 
types of misstatements. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests when there is a directional prediction and two-tailed 




Association between Debt-Related Misstatements and SameAU 
Panel A: Debt-Related Misstatements 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
SameAUt-1 -0.598** 0.026 -0.741** 0.021 
Size -0.396** 0.024 -0.417** 0.033 
MA 0.237 0.686 0.011 0.985 
BTM 0.411** 0.031 0.424** 0.031 
Leverage 1.347* 0.058 1.488** 0.043 
FIN 1.294*** 0.001 1.059*** 0.010 
Loss 0.719** 0.038 0.800** 0.040 
BigN 0.187 0.684 0.033 0.951 
Audit Fees 0.393 0.184 0.434 0.199 
Tax Fees 0.040 0.253 0.084** 0.037 
Other Fees 0.002 0.942 0.011 0.742 
Intercept -9.373*** 0.003 -10.517*** 0.004 
Cluster by Company Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 7,870 6,651 
Pseudo R-squared 0.112 0.140 
Area under ROC curve 0.788 0.814 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. The dependent variable is 
Debt-Related Misstatement and the sample is conditional on the company having no other types 
of misstatements. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively, using one-tailed tests when there is a directional prediction and two-tailed tests 




TABLE 6, Cont. 
Association between Debt-Related Misstatements and SameAU 
Panel B:  Benefit Plan Complexity 







SameAUt-1 -0.645** 0.024 -0.584** 0.040 -0.588** 0.039
Size -0.424** 0.019 -0.427** 0.016 -0.424** 0.025
MA 0.166 0.777 0.113 0.846 0.164 0.779
BTM 0.376* 0.078 0.388* 0.061 0.381* 0.066
Leverage 1.277* 0.067 1.239* 0.078 1.271* 0.072
FIN 1.261*** 0.001 1.276*** 0.001 1.262*** 0.001
Loss 0.744** 0.037 0.740** 0.039 0.742** 0.032
BigN 0.109 0.811 0.110 0.809 0.108 0.809
Audit Fees 0.424 0.172 0.409 0.190 0.425 0.158
Tax Fees 0.035 0.316 0.034 0.330 0.035 0.319
Other Fees -0.006 0.854 -0.004 0.902 -0.006 0.857
Uniont-1 -0.112 0.862     
SameAUt-1 x Uniont-1 0.239 0.779     
Real Estatet-1   0.563 0.269   
SameAUt-1 x Real Estatet-1   -0.052 0.935   
ESOPt-1     -0.006 0.994
SameAUt-1 x ESOPt-1     0.015 0.988
Intercept -9.441*** 0.006 -9.167*** 0.006 -9.480*** 0.003
Cluster by Company Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 7,346 7,346 7,346 
Pseudo R-squared 0.119 0.124 0.118 
Area under ROC curve 0.796 0.798 0.735 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. The dependent variable is 
Debt-Related Misstatement and the sample is conditional on the company having no other types 
of misstatements. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively, using one-tailed tests when there is a directional prediction and two-tailed tests 





Characteristics of Benefit Plan Audit Quality 
 (1) (2) 
 Benefit Plan 
Restatements 
Late Filings 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
SameAU -0.853 0.211 0.459** 0.039 
BigN_bp 0.454 0.521 -0.305 0.194 
Size -0.146 0.282 -0.122*** 0.004 
Growth 1.193 0.237 0.634 0.108 
ChangeEMP 0.594 0.158 0.122 0.747 
Loss -0.576 0.422 0.388** 0.019 
Influence 0.605 0.744 -0.218 0.666 
Benefit Plan City Specialist -0.216 0.631 -0.244* 0.091 
Audit Tenure_bp 0.315 0.530 0.379*** 0.005 
Busy_bp 0.931 0.201 0.354 0.281 
Number_of_plans -0.692 0.334 0.375 0.176 
Days_bw_opinions -0.170 0.754   
Union 1.043*** 0.005 0.025 0.891 
Real Estate 0.825** 0.048 0.266 0.152 
Joint Ventures 1.235 0.127 0.054 0.921 
ESOP 1.245*** 0.002 -0.046 0.807 
     
Intercept -3.829 0.129 -11.213*** 0.000 
Cluster by Company Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No No 
Number of Observations 8,056 8,056 
Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.045 
Area under ROC curve 0.802 0.671 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All 




Characteristics of Benefit Plan Quality 
 (1) (2) 
 Excise Taxes or Late 
Contributions 
EBSA Fines 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
SameAU 0.456 0.295 -0.878 0.125 
BigN_bp 0.042 0.924 1.153** 0.023 
Size -0.094 0.207 0.125 0.591 
Growth 0.568 0.203 -3.180 0.332 
ChangeEMP 0.889* 0.062 0.379 0.703 
Loss 0.082 0.720 0.032 0.975 
Influence -0.414 0.640 -0.166 0.925 
Benefit Plan City Specialist -0.173 0.383 1.990** 0.012 
Audit Tenure_bp 0.278 0.168 1.578** 0.036 
Busy_bp -0.259 0.577 1.381 0.228 
Number_of_Plans 0.636* 0.051 -0.181 0.894 
Days_bw_opinions -0.063 0.857 0.757 0.584 
Union 0.631** 0.015 1.399** 0.039 
Real Estate 0.363 0.184 0.057 0.938 
Joint Ventures 0.467 0.393   
ESOP -0.255 0.328 0.338 0.473 
     
Intercept -4.164** 0.023 -13.987 0.116 
Cluster by Company Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes No 
Industry Fixed Effects No No 
Number of Observations 8,056 8,056 
Pseudo R-squared 0.032 0.163 
Area under ROC curve 0.660 0.812 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All 






Characteristics of Switching Benefit Plan Auditors 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics, SameAU in the Prior Year 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75% 
Size 5,033 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 
Growth 5,033 8.23 1.81 6.97 8.09 9.52 
ChangeEMP 5,033 0.08 0.18 -0.01 0.05 0.13 
Loss 5,033 -0.05 0.19 -0.11 -0.05 0.02 
BigN_bpt-1 5,033 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 
Influence 5,033 0.86 0.35 1 1 1 
Benefit Plan City 
Specialist t-1 5,033 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.05 
Audit Tenure_bp t-1 5,033 0.33 0.47 0 0 1 
Busy_bp t-1 5,033 0.36 0.48 0 0 1 
Number_of_Plans t-1 5,033 0.04 0.20 0 0 0 
Days_bw_opinions t-1 5,033 0.84 0.28 0.69 0.69 1.10 
Union t-1 5,033 4.72 0.42 4.64 4.76 4.83 
Real Estate t-1 5,033 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 
Joint Venture t-1 5,033 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 
ESOPt-1 5,033 0.02 0.13 0 0 0 




TABLE 9, Cont. 
Characteristics of Switching Benefit Plan Auditors 
Panel B:  Descriptive Statistics, DifferentAu in the Prior Year 
Size 2932 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 
Growth 2932 7.77 1.67 6.66 7.71 8.82 
ChangeEMP 2932 0.08 0.19 -0.01 0.05 0.13 
Loss 2932 -0.06 0.21 -0.11 -0.04 0.02 
BigN_bpt-1 2932 0.17 0.37 0 0 0 
Influence 2932 0.02 0.12 0 0 0 
Benefit Plan City 
Specialist t-1 2932 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Audit Tenure_bp t-1 2932 0.37 0.48 0 0 1 
Busy_bp t-1 2932 0.59 0.49 0 1 1 
Number_of_Plans t-1 2932 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 
Days_bw_opinions t-1 2932 0.83 0.27 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Union t-1 2932 4.75 0.45 4.63 4.76 4.84 
Real Estate t-1 2932 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 
Joint Venture t-1 2932 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 
ESOPt-1 2932 0.01 0.10 0 0 0 
Note: All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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TABLE 9, Cont. 
Characteristics of Switching Benefit Plan Auditors 
Panel C:  Switching Benefit Plan Auditor 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. The dependent variable is 
Switch_bp. For column (1) the sample is conditional on the company having the same audit firm 
for the financial statement audit and the benefit plan audit in the prior period. For column (2) the 
sample is conditional on the company not having the same audit firm for the financial statement 
audit and the benefit plan audit in the prior period ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
  
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Size -0.180*** 0.000 0.070 0.206 
Growth -0.405 0.352 0.886* 0.052 
ChangeEMP -0.377 0.323 0.607* 0.089 
Loss 0.305* 0.053 0.136 0.503 
BigN_bpt-1 0.553*** 0.005 1.171*** 0.002 
Influence 0.273 0.609 0.848 0.215 
Benefit Plan City Specialist t-1 -0.176 0.153 -0.355** 0.022 
Audit Tenure_bp t-1 0.010 0.937 -0.784*** 0.000 
Busy_bp t-1 -0.131 0.673 -0.232 0.607 
Number_of_Plans t-1 -0.215 0.375 0.103 0.748 
Days_bw_opinions t-1 0.095 0.494 0.049 0.789 
Union t-1 0.015 0.926 -0.099 0.634 
Real Estate t-1 0.325* 0.053 0.199 0.385 
Joint Venture t-1 -0.370 0.473 0.134 0.838 
ESOPt-1 0.125 0.421 -0.346 0.128 
     
Intercept -1.688** 0.037 -2.179** 0.048 
Cluster by Company Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 5,033 2,932 
Pseudo R-squared 0.036 0.068 




Characteristics of Switching Financial Statement Auditors 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75% 
Switcht 5,028 0.02 0.15 0 0 0 
Growtht-1 5,028 0.08 0.19 -0.02 0.05 0.13 
Absdacct-1 5,028 0.37 1.23 0.03 0.07 0.20 
InvRECt-1 5,028 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.24 0.35 
GCt-1 5,028 0.00 0.05 0 0 0 
MODOPt-1 5,028 0.54 0.50 0 1 1 
Audit Tenuret-1 5,028 0.10 0.30 0 0 0 
ROAt-1 5,028 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.08 
Losst-1 5,028 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 
Leverage t-1 5,028 0.60 0.21 0.46 0.59 0.72 
Cash t-1 5,028 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.11 
Mismatch t-1 5,028 0.07 0.25 0 0 0 
National Leader t-1 5,028 0.31 0.46 0 0 1 
Size t-1 5,028 8.00 1.78 6.77 7.91 9.16 
MA t-1 5,028 0.98 0.14 1 1 1 
SameAUt-1 5,028 0.58 0.49 0 1 1 
Switch_bpt-1 5,028 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 




TABLE 10, Cont. 
Characteristics of Switching Financial Statement Auditors 
Panel B:  SameAU and Switching 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. The dependent variable is 
Switch. For column (2) the sample is conditioned on the company not having switched its benefit 
plan audit firm in the current or prior period. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
  
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Growtht-1 0.044 0.926 0.291 0.670 
Absdacct-1 -0.057 0.492 -0.119 0.272 
InvRECt-1 0.420 0.456 0.493 0.549 
GCt-1 0.690 0.458   
MODOPt-1 -0.126 0.553 -0.137 0.677 
Audit Tenuret-1 -0.706** 0.044 -1.385** 0.029 
ROAt-1 -0.717 0.665 -0.559 0.801 
Losst-1 0.389 0.263 0.431 0.383 
Leverage t-1 0.951** 0.042 0.961 0.113 
Cash t-1 -0.388 0.755 0.852 0.588 
Mismatch t-1 0.686* 0.057 0.268 0.600 
National Leader t-1 -0.317 0.171 -0.350 0.265 
Size t-1 -0.321*** 0.000 -0.363*** 0.003 
MA t-1 -1.034** 0.047 -0.888 0.259 
SameAUt-1 -0.706*** 0.002 -1.314*** 0.000 
     
Intercept 0.516 0.693 -1.212 0.416 
Cluster by Company Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 5,028 4,355 
Pseudo R-squared 0.100 0.127 
Area under ROC curve 0.763 0.792 
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TABLE 10, Cont. 
Characteristics of Switching Financial Statement Auditors 
Panel C:  Selecting a New Benefit Plan Audit Firm 
 
Note:  This table presents results of estimating logistic regressions. The dependent variable is 
Switch. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 





 Coefficient p-value 
Growtht-1 0.037 0.937 
Absdacct-1 -0.063 0.457 
InvRECt-1 0.340 0.550 
GCt-1 0.482 0.610 
MODOPt-1 -0.084 0.695 
Audit Tenuret-1 -0.722** 0.036 
ROAt-1 -0.892 0.585 
Losst-1 0.364 0.293 
Leverage t-1 0.940** 0.041 
Cash t-1 -0.557 0.649 
Mismatch t-1 0.639* 0.059 
National Leader t-1 -0.269 0.257 
Size t-1 -0.354*** 0.000 
MA t-1 -1.046** 0.040 
Switch_bpt-1 0.664** 0.016 
   
Intercept 0.193 0.880 
Cluster by Company Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Number of Observations 5,028 
Pseudo R-squared 0.094 
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